Operation Claw-Lock: Turkey’s 2022 Offensive Against the PKK in Iraq

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Originally published 2022-04-20.

Turkey's April 2022 Operation Claw-Lock in Northern Iraq

Operation Claw-Lock (in Turkish, Pençe-Kilit) was a cross-border offensive that Turkey opened on the night of 17–18 April 2022 against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the PKK, in the mountains of northern Iraq. Warplanes, drones and artillery hit the first targets, and commandos followed by helicopter and on foot into three border areas: Metina, Zap and Avashin-Basyan, all in the Duhok region of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Ankara described it as a pre-emptive move. Officials said the PKK used these mountain bases to plan and launch attacks inside Turkey, and that intelligence pointed to a large attack being prepared. Below is what happened, why northern Iraq keeps returning to the headlines, how Baghdad responded, and how the wider conflict changed in the years after.

What Turkey announced in April 2022

Defence Minister Hulusi Akar released video of the strikes, showing missiles and shells landing on what the ministry called shelters, bunkers, caves, tunnels, ammunition depots and headquarters. Euronews, citing the state news agency Anadolu, reported his assessment that things were “continuing successfully as planned” and that the objectives of the first phase had been taken.

Akar framed the offensive as part of a four-decade fight. He said the struggle would go on “until the last terrorist is neutralised.” Ground troops from the Special Forces Command took part, backed by attack helicopters and armed drones. Wikipedia’s summary of the operation, drawing on Turkish and international reporting, puts the force at around 15,000 personnel, with F-16 jets, T129 ATAK helicopters and Bayraktar drones.

In the first days there were no independent casualty figures. The PKK issued no immediate statement, and the remote terrain made outside verification almost impossible. Later tallies came mostly from the two sides themselves and vary widely, so they are best read as claims rather than established numbers.

The PKK and a conflict that began in 1984

The PKK was founded in November 1978, with Abdullah Öcalan at its head, and began its armed insurgency against the Turkish state on 15 August 1984. More than 40,000 people have died in the conflict since then, most of them Kurdish civilians in south-eastern Turkey, according to figures summarised by Wikipedia’s article on the group.

Its early goal was an independent Kurdish state. From the mid-1990s the movement’s official platform shifted towards autonomy and wider political and cultural rights for Kurds inside Turkey, though some scholars argue the long-term aim never fully disappeared. Turkey, the United States and the European Union all list the PKK as a terrorist organisation; a number of analysts dispute whether that label still fits its later conduct.

Kurds are one of the largest peoples in the Middle East without a state of their own. Their homeland is split mainly between Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran. That geography explains why a conflict that is largely about Turkey’s own Kurdish population keeps spilling across borders.

Why the fighting reaches into Iraq

Since the 1990s the PKK’s main headquarters has been in the Qandil Mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan, a region that has enjoyed broad self-rule since the 1990s and has had formal autonomy under Iraq’s 2005 constitution. Smaller bases are spread along the rugged border with Turkey. For Ankara, these camps are a rear base for attacks; for the PKK, they are a refuge beyond the reach of most Turkish ground forces.

Turkey has carried out cross-border raids against the group since the 1980s, including a major ground incursion in 2008. Since 2019 these operations have carried “Claw” code names: Claw-Eagle and Claw-Tiger in 2020, Claw-Lightning and Claw-Thunderbolt in 2021, and then Claw-Lock in 2022. Each pushed Turkish outposts deeper into the mountains.

Neighbouring Syria adds another layer. Kurdish-led forces have controlled much of north-eastern Syria, sometimes called Rojava, since around 2012–2014. Turkey regards the main Syrian Kurdish militia, the YPG, as an offshoot of the PKK and launched military offensives into northern Syria in 2016, 2018 and 2019. Turkish officials worry that Kurdish self-rule next door could strengthen demands at home or provide launch pads for attacks.

How Iraq and the region responded

The Iraqi government objected. President Barham Salih called the operation a threat to Iraq’s national security and demanded a withdrawal, the foreign ministry called it a breach of sovereignty, and the two countries summoned each other’s envoys. In May 2022 Iraq’s ambassador to the United Nations lodged a complaint with the Security Council. President Erdoğan said Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government had agreed to the operation, which Iraqi and Peshmerga officials denied.

The Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil was in a harder position. Its dominant party, the KDP, has long been a rival of the PKK and depends heavily on trade with Turkey, so its criticism was far more muted. Villagers in the border districts, meanwhile, have repeatedly reported damage, displacement and lost farmland from years of strikes.

Civilians were caught in the wider pattern of violence. In July 2022 shelling of a resort in Zakho district killed at least eight tourists and wounded more than 20; Iraq blamed Turkey, while Ankara denied responsibility and blamed the PKK. Later in 2022 the pro-Kurdish HDP and the head of the Turkish Medical Association, Şebnem Korur Fincancı, called for an investigation into claims of chemical weapons use; Turkey rejected the claims, and Korur Fincancı was arrested and prosecuted on a terrorism-propaganda charge.

Human rights and politics inside Turkey

The offensive cannot be separated from Turkish domestic politics. Groups such as Human Rights Watch have documented the jailing of journalists and critics and abuses affecting Kurdish communities, and Freedom House rated Turkey “Not Free” in its 2020 report. In 2021 Turkey’s chief prosecutor asked the Constitutional Court to close the HDP, the main pro-Kurdish party, which says it seeks Kurdish rights through peaceful politics.

Supporters of the government counter that the PKK has killed soldiers, police and civilians for decades and that no state would tolerate armed bases across its border. Both points can be true at once: the threat is real, and so are the concerns about how the fight is conducted and what it does to civil liberties.

From Claw-Lock to the PKK’s dissolution

Turkey declared its first objectives met within days and later extended air strikes to Sulaymaniyah province. The campaign continued, in one form or another, into 2024. Yet the bigger change came through politics rather than the battlefield.

On 27 February 2025 Öcalan, imprisoned on İmralı island since 1999, called on the PKK to lay down its arms and dissolve. The group declared a ceasefire on 1 March, held a congress in early May and announced its dissolution on 12 May 2025. On 11 July 2025 a first group of fighters destroyed their weapons at a ceremony in the mountains near Sulaymaniyah, as reported by AFP. The process of disarmament, legal steps for former fighters and wider Kurdish rights in Turkey remain open questions.

Key points to remember

  • Operation Claw-Lock began on 17–18 April 2022 in the Metina, Zap and Avashin-Basyan areas of northern Iraq.
  • It was one of a series of “Claw” operations Turkey has run against the PKK since 2019.
  • Iraq protested formally, including at the UN Security Council; Turkey said the operation was self-defence.
  • Casualty figures came mainly from the parties and could not be independently confirmed.
  • The PKK announced its dissolution in May 2025 and began disarming that July.

For background on earlier Turkish strikes and their impact on Kurdish communities, see our report from June 2020.

Sources: Euronews: Turkey launches new military offensive in northern Iraq (18 April 2022); Operation Claw-Lock, Wikipedia; Kurdistan Workers’ Party, Wikipedia; Institut kurde de Paris (AFP): PKK fighters to begin disarming (July 2025); Human Rights Watch: Turkey; Freedom House: Turkey, Freedom in the World 2020

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