Pegasus Spyware in Downing Street: What Citizen Lab Found

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Originally published 2022-04-19.

Reports of Spyware Targeting UK Government Devices in 2022

In April 2022 the Citizen Lab, a digital security research group at the University of Toronto, disclosed that it had warned the British government about suspected infections with Pegasus spyware inside official UK networks. One suspected infection was linked to a device on the network of the Prime Minister's Office at 10 Downing Street, then occupied by Boris Johnson. Others involved the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

The key word is "suspected". Citizen Lab did not say which phones were affected, whose they were, or whether any information was taken. It said it had seen signs of infection and passed them on through official channels. The UK government declined to comment. Here is what was actually reported, how Pegasus works, and what the episode tells us about the trade in commercial spyware.

What Citizen Lab reported

In a statement published on 18 April 2022, Citizen Lab's director, Professor Ron Deibert, confirmed that in 2020 and 2021 the group "observed and notified the government of the United Kingdom of multiple suspected instances of Pegasus spyware infections within official UK networks."

The researchers attributed the suspected cases to particular Pegasus customers, which they call "operators":

  • 10 Downing Street: the suspected infection was associated with an operator that Citizen Lab links to the United Arab Emirates.
  • Foreign Office: the suspected infections were associated with operators linked to the UAE, India, Cyprus and Jordan.

Citizen Lab added that the Foreign Office cases could involve devices used by staff abroad on foreign SIM cards, since the department has diplomats in many countries. An attribution to an "operator linked to" a country is an assessment based on technical patterns, not proof that a particular government ordered the hacking. None of the governments named publicly accepted responsibility.

Why the researchers went public

Citizen Lab usually stays out of cases where one government spies on another; its work focuses on spyware used against journalists, activists and lawyers. Deibert explained that it makes occasional exceptions when it believes a warning can reduce harm. In this case, the group said it was concerned because a UK-based lawyer involved in litigation against NSO Group had himself been targeted with Pegasus in 2019, and it wanted the government to take the wider threat seriously.

The disclosure came on the same day Citizen Lab published a separate investigation, later known as CatalanGate, into the hacking of dozens of people connected to the Catalan independence movement in Spain. That report brought fresh attention to how widely the tool had spread.

How Pegasus spyware works

Pegasus is made by NSO Group, an Israeli company whose exports require approval from Israel's Ministry of Defense. NSO says it sells the software only to government agencies to fight crime and terrorism.

Once installed on a phone, Pegasus can give the operator near-total access. It can read text messages and emails, including those from encrypted apps, collect passwords, track the phone's location, and switch on the microphone and camera without the owner's knowledge. Some versions use so-called zero-click exploits, which install the spyware without the victim tapping a link or opening a file. The software is also designed to remove itself if it loses contact with its control servers for a long period, which can make later forensic work harder.

The original version of this story described Pegasus as a "Trojan horse". That label is loose: early versions did rely on tricking people into clicking a malicious link, but later attacks often needed no action from the target at all.

Context: the Pegasus Project and the US blacklist

The UK disclosure followed a year of damaging revelations about NSO. In July 2021 a consortium of news organisations led by Forbidden Stories, with technical help from Amnesty International, published the Pegasus Project, based on a leaked list of about 50,000 phone numbers believed to be of interest to NSO clients. The list included journalists, human rights defenders and politicians in many countries.

In November 2021 the US Commerce Department added NSO Group to its trade blacklist, saying its tools had been used to conduct transnational repression. In 2023 an executive order restricted US government use of commercial spyware that poses security risks.

Legal pressure followed. In December 2024 a US federal court found NSO liable for hacking around 1,400 WhatsApp users through a flaw in the messaging app, and in May 2025 a jury ordered the company to pay WhatsApp about $167 million in damages, although the punitive part of that award was later reported to have been cut sharply by the court.

The security backdrop in 2022

The report landed at a tense moment. Russia had invaded Ukraine in February 2022, and in March President Joe Biden had warned that US intelligence suggested Russia was exploring options for cyberattacks against Western targets. The Pegasus findings were not linked to Russia, but they underlined that even the most protected offices in a NATO country could be exposed through ordinary-looking mobile phones.

Johnson's own phone security had already drawn criticism. In 2021 it was reported that his personal mobile number had been freely available online for around 15 years, listed at the bottom of an old press release.

What it means for ordinary phone users

Pegasus is expensive and is used against selected targets, so most people are very unlikely to encounter it. Still, the same habits that protect against commercial spyware also protect against more common threats:

  • Install operating system and app updates promptly, since they often close the security holes that spyware exploits.
  • Restart your phone regularly; some spyware does not survive a reboot and must re-infect the device.
  • Be wary of unexpected links, even from familiar contacts.
  • If you are a journalist, activist or official at higher risk, consider protective features such as Apple's Lockdown Mode and seek help from specialist organisations. Amnesty International publishes a free forensic tool, the Mobile Verification Toolkit, used by researchers to check for signs of infection.

The Downing Street case shows that spyware is no longer only a problem for dissidents in authoritarian states. It is now part of ordinary espionage between governments, including allies, and the companies that build it remain largely unaccountable to the people it is used against.

Sources: Citizen Lab, UK Government Officials Targeted with Pegasus (18 April 2022); ITV News, Watchdog warns Boris Johnson of suspected spyware attack on No 10 (18 April 2022); Wikipedia, Pegasus (spyware); original report via MSN.

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