Originally published 2020-06-26.

Turkey's intervention in Libya in 2020 was about more than winning a war. By backing the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) with drones, advisers and fighters, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also positioned Turkish companies for Libya's construction, energy and banking sectors, and secured a maritime deal that supported Ankara's claims in the eastern Mediterranean. Critics saw an expansionist project; Turkish officials described a partnership with a legitimate, UN-recognised government.
Below we look at what Turkey stood to gain, which of the figures quoted at the time hold up, the obstacles Ankara faced, and what happened after the guns went quiet.
How Turkey became the GNA's decisive ally
Libya split into rival governments in 2014. The GNA held Tripoli and much of the west, while the eastern parliament supported Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA), which in April 2019 launched an offensive to take the capital.
In November 2019 Ankara and the GNA signed two memoranda: one on security and military cooperation, the other drawing maritime boundaries between the two countries. Turkey's parliament authorised a deployment on 2 January 2020, and support arrived quickly: armed drones, air-defence systems, training teams, naval cover and thousands of fighters recruited from Syrian armed groups that Turkey sponsored. Turkish drones played a large part in the GNA's counter-offensive, launched in March 2020, and by June Haftar's forces had been pushed out of western Libya.
That military success is the background to the economic story. The more indispensable Turkey became to the GNA, the stronger its hand in shaping Libya's reconstruction.
Construction, contracts and banking
Turkish firms are not newcomers to Libya. Under Muammar Gaddafi, Turkish contractors built housing, roads, hospitals and power facilities, and a large Turkish workforce lived in the country; figures of around 25,000 Turkish residents before 2011 were widely cited. When the 2011 uprising began, Turkey evacuated its citizens and many projects were left half-finished.
Turkish business groups have long pressed for compensation and for the resumption of that work. In 2020 reports put the value of unfinished Turkish contracts in Libya in the range of billions of dollars, with some estimates around $18 billion; these were industry estimates rather than audited figures, so they are best treated as an indication of scale. Turkish and GNA officials also discussed cooperation in electricity generation, construction and finance, and Erdoğan spoke publicly about Turkish firms helping to rebuild the country.
It is worth separating ambition from outcome. A statement of interest, a memorandum of understanding and a signed, funded contract are three very different things, and many announcements of that period did not quickly become projects on the ground.
Energy and the maritime deal
Libya holds the largest proven oil reserves in Africa, and its economy depends almost entirely on hydrocarbons. Access to Libyan oil and gas, and to exploration rights offshore, was an obvious attraction for an energy importer like Turkey.
The maritime memorandum of November 2019 was just as important. It drew a boundary between the Turkish and Libyan continental shelves that ignored the Greek island of Crete, supporting Ankara's "Blue Homeland" doctrine for wider control of sea zones. Turkey then said it could explore for hydrocarbons in areas covered by the deal. Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and Israel objected strongly, France and Egypt denounced it, and the eastern Libyan parliament rejected it. In August 2020 Greece and Egypt signed their own partial maritime agreement in response. Our report on how several Mediterranean governments asked the UN to reject the deal covers that dispute in more detail.
The quarrel also overlapped with long-running tensions over Cyprus, where Turkey has occupied the north of the island since 1974 and has repeatedly sent survey and drilling ships into waters that the Republic of Cyprus claims as its exclusive economic zone.
Political and ideological influence
Analysts also pointed to a political motive. Some factions within the Tripoli camp, including politicians linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, were seen as sympathetic to Erdoğan's AK Party, and critics argued that Ankara hoped to keep friendly figures in power in any post-war settlement. Turkish officials rejected that framing, stressing that they were supporting the internationally recognised government against a warlord. Both readings can be partly true: states usually pursue strategic, economic and ideological goals at once.
The limits on Turkey's ambitions in 2020
At the time, many commentators expected the pandemic to push Turkey into a deep recession, with forecasts of a contraction of around 4 percent for 2020. That forecast turned out to be wrong: thanks to a credit boom, Turkey's economy grew by roughly 1.9 percent in 2020, one of the few major economies to expand that year. The cost showed up elsewhere, in a sharply falling lira, rising inflation and depleted foreign-exchange reserves.
Turkey was also stretched militarily. It was conducting operations against the PKK in south-eastern Turkey and northern Iraq and against Kurdish-led forces in northern Syria, which our report on Turkish strikes on Kurdish areas covers. At home and abroad the government faced criticism over press freedom, the jailing of opponents and the weakening of democratic checks, including the treatment of artists such as the members of the band Grup Yorum, two of whom died on hunger strike. Relations with fellow NATO members were strained too, as seen in the public row with France over Libya.
Then there was the war itself. Egypt warned that it would intervene if the GNA advanced on Sirte, the gateway to the oil terminals, and Russia's Wagner contractors were dug in further south. A full victory that handed Turkey control of Libya's oil wealth was never as likely as some predicted.
What happened next
The front line froze around Sirte in mid-2020. Both sides declared a ceasefire on 21 August 2020, and a permanent ceasefire was signed on 23 October 2020. In March 2021 an interim Government of National Unity was formed, though the elections it was meant to organise were postponed and Libya remains divided between rival authorities.
Turkey did not leave. Its parliament kept renewing the troop mandate, extending it again in December 2023 for two years from January 2024, and Turkish firms returned to construction and energy work in western Libya. Ankara also gradually rebuilt contacts with the authorities in the east, and energy cooperation remained a central topic of talks between Erdoğan and Libyan leaders. So the economic gains did come, but more slowly and less dramatically than the most excited forecasts of 2020 suggested.
How to read claims about foreign influence
When a government's foreign policy is described as a bid for "control" of another country's economy, a few questions help. Which agreements were actually signed, and are their terms public? Has money been invested, or only promised? Are the headline figures audited, or estimates from interested business groups? And how durable is the political arrangement that the deals depend on? Applied to Turkey and Libya, those questions suggest a real but bounded influence: substantial commercial and strategic gains in the west of the country, far short of controlling Libya's banking or energy sectors.
Sources: Wikipedia: Turkish military intervention in the Second Libyan Civil War; Wikipedia: Second Libyan Civil War; Wikipedia: Libya–Turkey relations; Wikipedia: Economy of Turkey.

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