First published June 26, 2020.

In June 2020 Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi warned that if Turkish-backed Libyan forces pushed on to the coastal city of Sirte, Egypt would consider it a “red line” and could intervene militarily in Libya. Speaking to troops near the Libyan border, he said Egypt had a legitimate right to act and told the army to be ready for missions abroad. A month later, Egypt’s parliament voted to allow troops to be deployed outside the country.
In the end Egypt did not invade. The front line froze around Sirte, a ceasefire followed in the autumn, and Libya moved into a fragile political process. This article explains why Sirte mattered so much, who was backing whom, and how the stand-off was defused.
How Libya reached this point
Libya’s crisis goes back to 2011, when an uprising backed by NATO airstrikes ended Muammar Gaddafi’s four decades in power. Gaddafi was killed near Sirte in October that year. No stable national government replaced him, and by 2014 the country had split into rival camps, starting what is often called the Second Libyan Civil War.
By 2020 the two main sides were:
- The Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj. It was formed under a UN-backed agreement in 2015 and was the internationally recognised government.
- The House of Representatives, a parliament sitting in the east at Tobruk, allied with the Libyan National Army (LNA) of the military commander Khalifa Haftar, who controlled most of the east and south.
In April 2019 Haftar launched an offensive to take Tripoli. For more than a year his forces fought on the edge of the capital, helped by foreign backers, and for a time it looked as if the GNA might fall.
Turkey’s intervention changed the war
In January 2020 Turkey’s parliament approved sending troops to support the GNA. Turkey supplied military advisers, armed drones, air defences and naval support, and it recruited thousands of Syrian fighters to fight in Libya, a move widely criticised by human rights monitors.
Ankara’s motives were strategic and economic. In late 2019 it had signed a maritime boundary deal with the GNA that Greece, Cyprus and Egypt rejected, because it ignored Greek islands such as Crete in claiming a Turkish zone across the eastern Mediterranean. Turkish companies also had large contracts in Libya, reportedly worth billions of dollars, that had stalled since 2011.
With Turkish drones in the air, the balance shifted quickly. In spring 2020 GNA forces retook coastal towns west of Tripoli, captured the Al-Watiya air base, and by early June had driven Haftar’s forces from the outskirts of the capital and the town of Tarhuna. They then turned east, towards Sirte.
Why Sirte was the line
Sirte sits on the Mediterranean coast roughly halfway between Tripoli and Benghazi. Haftar’s forces had taken it in January 2020. Its importance came from its position as the gateway to Libya’s “oil crescent,” the stretch of coast with the country’s main oil export terminals at places such as Ras Lanuf and Es Sider. Whoever held Sirte and the nearby Al-Jufra air base inland would be in a strong position to control Libya’s oil revenue.
For Egypt, an advance beyond Sirte would have brought a Turkish-backed force much closer to its own long western border. In his speech on 20 June 2020, Sisi named Sirte and Al-Jufra as Egypt’s red line. He also suggested that Libyan tribes in the east could ask for Egyptian help, saying in remarks widely reported at the time that a request from the Libyan people would show the world that Egypt and Libya “are one country, one interest.”
Ziad Akl, a Libya specialist at the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo, read it as a warning rather than a plan, telling reporters: “The aim is deterrence; Egypt does not want a single Turk to cross the line into eastern Libya.” He added that ground troops would be Egypt’s last resort.
A proxy war with many outside players
Libya’s war drew in an unusual number of foreign states, often on opposite sides:
- Backing Haftar and the LNA: Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, which according to UN reports carried out or enabled airstrikes; Russia, through fighters linked to the Wagner Group, which UN experts reported on the ground; and France, which was accused of quiet military and political support for Haftar, accusations Paris has largely rejected.
- Backing the GNA: Turkey, with drones, advisers and Syrian fighters, and to a lesser extent Qatar politically.
Ideology also played a role. Sisi came to power in 2013 after the army removed President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Egypt has since treated the Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation. Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was sympathetic to the Brotherhood, and Cairo saw some of the militias allied to the GNA as Islamist. Supporters of the GNA rejected that label and noted that it was GNA-aligned forces that drove the Islamic State group out of Sirte in 2016, after IS had held the city for over a year.
How the stand-off was defused
On 20 July 2020 Egypt’s parliament approved deploying troops abroad to defend national security on the “western front,” a clear reference to Libya. For a few weeks there were real fears of a direct clash between two of the region’s largest armies.
Instead, the front stopped at Sirte. On 21 August 2020 both the GNA and the eastern authorities announced a ceasefire, and on 23 October 2020 military representatives of both sides, meeting as the UN-facilitated “5+5” Joint Military Commission, signed a permanent ceasefire. It required foreign fighters and mercenaries to leave the country within three months, a deadline that was not met.
In March 2021 a new interim Government of National Unity took office with the aim of leading Libya to national elections in December 2021. Those elections were postponed, and rival administrations in the east and west re-emerged, so Libya remains divided even though large-scale fighting has not returned.
Why this episode still matters
Sisi’s red line is a good example of deterrence working, at least in the short term. By making the cost of going further clear, Egypt helped freeze the war along a line that both sides could accept without admitting defeat. Turkey kept its gains in the west, and the LNA kept the east and the oil crescent.
It also showed how a civil war can become a contest between outside powers, each pursuing its own security, energy and ideological goals. For ordinary Libyans, that has meant years of displacement, damaged infrastructure and a country with vast oil wealth but no single government able to use it for everyone.
Relations between Egypt and Turkey later thawed: the two countries restored full diplomatic ties in 2023, and Erdoğan visited Cairo in 2024. Libya’s own divisions, however, are still waiting to be resolved.
Sources: Wikipedia: Second Libyan Civil War; Wikipedia: Turkish military intervention in the Second Libyan Civil War; Wikipedia: Sirte. Ziad Akl’s comments as reported in international press coverage of 20–21 June 2020.

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