Originally published 2022-06-29.
On 28 June 2022, at NATO's summit in Madrid, Turkey agreed to stop blocking Finland and Sweden from joining the alliance. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Finnish President Sauli Niinistö and Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson signed a three-way memorandum that addressed Ankara's complaints about Kurdish militant groups, arms exports and extraditions. In return, Turkey backed formal invitations to both Nordic countries the next day.
That deal did not make them members on the spot. Finland joined on 4 April 2023 and Sweden on 7 March 2024, after a long ratification fight in which Turkey and Hungary held out the longest. Here is what Turkey wanted, what the Nordic countries signed, and why it took so long.
Why Finland and Sweden applied at all
For decades both countries stayed outside NATO. Finland, which shares a 1,340-kilometre border with Russia, had a long tradition of careful neutrality toward Moscow. Sweden had stayed out of military alliances for about two centuries. Both worked closely with NATO as partners, but public support for full membership in Finland usually sat somewhere between 14% and 32%.
Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 changed that almost overnight. Within days, polls in Finland showed a majority in favour, and by May support had reached about three in four. Finland's parliament approved an application by 188 votes to 8, and the two countries submitted their bids together on 18 May 2022.
What Turkey objected to
NATO admits new members only with the agreement of every existing one, so a single government can stall an application. Turkey used that leverage. Its main complaint concerned Kurdish armed groups. Ankara treats the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which has fought the Turkish state since 1984, as a terrorist organisation, as do the EU and the US. It also regards the Syrian Kurdish PYD party and its armed wing, the YPG, as PKK offshoots. Western governments, by contrast, had worked with the YPG as a key ground partner against the Islamic State group in Syria.
Turkey accused Sweden in particular of tolerating PKK activity and sheltering people it wanted to prosecute. Sweden has a sizeable Kurdish community, with estimates ranging from roughly 100,000 to about 170,000 people, and several Swedish MPs of Kurdish background. Ankara also wanted action against followers of the cleric Fethullah Gülen, whom it blames for the 2016 coup attempt, and an end to the arms export restrictions Finland and Sweden imposed after Turkey's 2019 military operation in northern Syria. Earlier in the spring, Turkey had threatened to block both bids over these issues.
What the Madrid memorandum said
The memorandum, published by the Swedish government, is short. Its main points:
- PKK: Finland and Sweden confirmed that the PKK is a proscribed terrorist organisation and committed to preventing its activities.
- YPG/PYD and the Gülen movement: both countries pledged not to support the YPG/PYD or the group Turkey calls FETÖ.
- Arms exports: the three governments stated that no national arms embargoes remained in place between them.
- Extraditions: Finland and Sweden agreed to address Turkey's pending deportation and extradition requests and to build bilateral legal frameworks for extradition.
- Follow-up: a Permanent Joint Mechanism of officials from the three countries would monitor progress.
Some critics in Sweden worried that the deal traded away principles on asylum and free speech. Supporters pointed out that court independence was untouched: extradition decisions would still go through Swedish and Finnish courts.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg called it an agreement that "paves the way for Finland and Sweden to join NATO." US President Joe Biden welcomed it as a crucial step toward the invitations, and Andersson stressed that both countries would be security providers within the alliance, not just beneficiaries.
From invitation to membership
Accession protocols were signed on 5 July 2022, and most allies ratified them within months. Turkey and Hungary did not.
Finland went first. Its own parliament approved accession in March 2023, Hungary and Turkey ratified at the end of that month, and Finland became NATO's 31st member on 4 April 2023, more than doubling the length of the alliance's land border with Russia.
Sweden waited longer. In early 2023 Turkey reacted angrily to Quran-burning protests that Swedish police had permitted on free-speech grounds, and Erdoğan said he viewed Finland's bid positively but not Sweden's. At the Vilnius summit in July 2023, Sweden promised a roadmap for implementing its counter-terrorism commitments and support for Turkey's ties with the EU. Turkey's parliament finally approved Sweden's membership on 23 January 2024. The next day, the US State Department moved ahead with a long-delayed sale of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey, a link both sides had been reluctant to state openly.
Hungary was last. After Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson visited Budapest and the two governments agreed on a purchase of Swedish Gripen jets, Hungary's parliament approved Sweden's accession on 26 February 2024. Sweden became NATO's 32nd member on 7 March 2024.
Turkey's balancing act with Russia and Ukraine
Turkey's position during this period was unusual for a NATO member. It did not join the Western sanctions imposed on Russia after the invasion, and it kept trade, tourism and energy links with Moscow open. At the same time, Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones, built by the company Baykar, had been sold to Ukraine since 2019 and were used against Russian armour and air defences in the early months of the war. Ankara also helped broker the July 2022 grain corridor deal through the Black Sea.
Seen in that light, the veto threat was less about Finland and Sweden themselves than about using a rare moment of leverage to win concessions on issues Turkey had pushed for years.
What the episode shows about NATO enlargement
- Unanimity gives every member a veto. Even a small objection can delay enlargement for months, and governments sometimes use that leverage for unrelated aims.
- An agreement is not accession. The Madrid memorandum removed one obstacle; membership still needed 30 national ratifications.
- Public opinion can move fast. Finnish support for membership roughly tripled within a few months of the invasion of Ukraine.
- Domestic politics travel. Swedish free-speech rules, Kurdish politics and US arms sales all ended up tied to the same application.
Sources: Government of Sweden: Trilateral Memorandum, Madrid, 28 June 2022 (PDF); Wikipedia: Finland–NATO relations; Wikipedia: Sweden–NATO relations; Wikipedia: Kurds in Sweden; Wikipedia: Bayraktar TB2; original reporting by The Guardian.
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