Originally published 2022-03-18. Events, ages and announcements in this article refer to March 2022.
On 11 March 2022, about two weeks after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the investor and philanthropist George Soros published an essay arguing that the attack marked the start of a third world war and that the close partnership between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping posed a threat to civilisation itself. The piece, titled "Vladimir Putin and the Risk of World War III", appeared on the commentary site Project Syndicate and was quickly picked up by financial and political media.
Below is a plain summary of what Soros actually argued, the events he was reacting to, how his warning should be read, and what happened in the months that followed.
Who George Soros is
Soros was born in Budapest in 1930 and survived the Nazi occupation of Hungary as a Jewish teenager before emigrating to Britain and then the United States. He made his fortune as a hedge fund manager and became one of the world's best-known philanthropists through the Open Society Foundations, which have funded civil society, education and human rights groups, particularly in the former Soviet bloc.
That background shapes the essay. Soros opens by recalling his own childhood encounter with Soviet soldiers in Hungary and his foundation's long work across Eastern Europe, and he presents his view of Putin as the product of decades of watching the Kremlin closely. He is also a polarising figure, admired by some for his philanthropy and targeted by others with conspiracy theories, so his opinions tend to be amplified and attacked in equal measure.
What Soros argued
The essay makes several linked claims:
- A world war had begun. His opening and closing message was that the invasion of 24 February 2022 should be understood as the beginning of a third world war, not a regional conflict.
- China gave a green light. Soros pointed to the meeting between Putin and Xi in Beijing on 4 February 2022, at the opening of the Winter Olympics, when the two governments issued a long joint statement announcing a close partnership. He argued the text must have been negotiated well in advance and that Xi appeared to give Putin a free hand.
- Putin misjudged Ukraine. In Soros's account, Putin expected Russian-speaking Ukrainians to welcome his troops, but they resisted as fiercely as everyone else. He also took aim at Putin's July 2021 essay claiming Russians and Ukrainians are one people.
- Escalation followed failure. Soros attributed the Russian army's poor early performance partly to corruption, and said Putin was responding by escalating, including indiscriminate bombing of civilians, strikes that hit hospitals, and the siege of Mariupol.
- Xi was having second thoughts. Soros noted that on 8 March Xi had spoken with French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, which he read as a sign Beijing saw that Putin had "gone rogue".
The essay ends on its sharpest line: "We can only hope that Putin and Xi will be removed from power before they can destroy our civilization."
The context in March 2022
When the essay appeared, the war was in its third week. Russian columns had failed to take Kyiv quickly, Western governments had imposed sweeping sanctions, and more than two million Ukrainians had already fled the country. Fears of a wider conflict were real: Russia had put its nuclear forces on heightened alert, and Western leaders were debating how much military aid they could send without being drawn in directly.
China's position was the great unknown. Beijing refused to call the invasion an invasion, abstained rather than voting against Russia at the United Nations, and blamed NATO expansion for the crisis, while also saying it respected Ukraine's sovereignty. Soros's essay was one of many attempts at the time to read Xi's intentions from limited evidence.
How to read a warning like this
It helps to separate three kinds of statement in the essay. Some are factual and checkable, such as the date of the Putin-Xi meeting or the existence of their joint statement. Some are interpretations, such as the claim that Xi effectively approved the invasion. And some are forecasts and rhetoric, such as calling the war the start of World War III or saying Putin had lost touch with reality.
The last category deserves the most caution. Descriptions of a leader as mad or detached from reality are political language, not a medical assessment. And "world war" is a framing choice: Soros meant that the stakes were global, not that armies of many nations were already fighting each other directly. Readers can agree or disagree with that framing, but it should stay attached to his name and to the date he wrote it.
It is also worth remembering that Soros has long been an outspoken critic of both Putin and Xi. That does not make him wrong, but it means the essay is best read as an informed opinion from a committed opponent of both governments, rather than as a neutral forecast.
What happened next
Several of Soros's points aged in different ways. He was right that Ukrainian resistance would upend the Kremlin's early plans: Russian forces withdrew from the Kyiv region within weeks. His expectation that the West would arm Ukraine more heavily also proved accurate, as military aid expanded through 2022 and beyond.
His hope that Putin and Xi would lose power did not come true. Xi secured an unprecedented third term as Communist Party leader in October 2022, and Putin remained firmly in control in Moscow. The relationship between Russia and China deepened rather than cooled, with trade between them growing as Western sanctions bit, although Beijing stopped short of openly supplying weapons on the scale some feared.
Soros returned to the theme in May 2022 at the World Economic Forum in Davos, again describing the invasion as possibly the beginning of a third world war and arguing that the best way to preserve civilisation was to defeat Putin as soon as possible.
Why the essay still gets read
The piece is a snapshot of how the invasion looked to a prominent Western observer at a moment of extreme uncertainty. Its value today lies less in whether every prediction held and more in what it shows about the fears of early 2022: that a European war could merge with rivalry between the United States and China, and that a close Moscow-Beijing alignment could reshape the international order. Those questions remain central to debates about the war and its aftermath.
Sources: George Soros, "Vladimir Putin and the Risk of World War III", Project Syndicate, 11 March 2022; TheStreet (original report).

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