Did Putin Sack Eight Generals? Ukraine’s March 2022 Claim Explained

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Originally published 2022-03-10.

In early March 2022, about two weeks into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Ukrainian officials claimed that Vladimir Putin had removed roughly eight Russian generals from their posts because the offensive was going far slower than planned. The claim came from Oleksiy Danilov, then secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council. Moscow never confirmed it, and no full list of names was ever published.

So what was actually known, what was rumour, and what does the episode tell us about how the war’s first weeks unfolded? This article sets out the claim, the evidence around it, and what happened next.

A March 2022 Claim That Putin Dismissed Eight Generals

Photo: Getty Images

The claim in short

Speaking to Ukrainian media around 10 March 2022, Danilov said Russia had about 8 generals removed from their posts because they did not complete the task. He added that replacements had been appointed and described the Russian leadership as desperate. British newspapers, including The Times, picked up the story, and it spread quickly online under headlines saying Putin had “sacked” his generals.

Two points are worth keeping in mind. First, the source was a senior official of a country at war, speaking about its enemy. Such statements can be accurate, but they are also part of the information war, intended to lift morale at home and sow doubt on the other side. Second, the Kremlin and Russia’s defence ministry did not confirm any dismissals. As a result, the number “eight” has never been independently verified.

Who Oleksiy Danilov was

Danilov served as secretary of the National Security and Defense Council from October 2019 to March 2024. The council is chaired formally by the president, so the secretary acts as its day-to-day head and one of the most senior security officials in the country. In the first weeks of the invasion he spoke often to the press about Russian troop movements and Kremlin decision-making.

That position gave his words weight, but it did not make them proof. Readers at the time had no way to check his figure, and later reporting did not produce a matching list of eight dismissed commanders.

Why Moscow had reason to be angry

Whatever the precise number of dismissals, the underlying picture Danilov described was real: the invasion was not going as Moscow had expected. Russian forces had pushed towards Kyiv from Belarus on 24 February, apparently hoping for a quick collapse of the Ukrainian government.

Instead, an airborne assault near Vasylkiv was repulsed, a huge Russian column stretching about 64 kilometres stalled north of the capital in late February and early March, and by 11 March much of that convoy had dispersed into the forests. Logistics problems, fuel shortages, stiff Ukrainian resistance and poor morale all played a part.

Russia was also losing senior officers at an unusual rate. Major General Andrey Sukhovetsky, a senior airborne commander, was reported killed near Kyiv around 28 February. Ukraine claimed further deaths of generals in early March; at least one of those claims, about Major General Vitaly Gerasimov, was later disputed. Losing generals so close to the front line was seen by analysts as a sign of broken command and communications.

The intelligence failure behind the war

Alongside the generals story came reports that Putin was furious with the FSB, Russia’s main security service, for its pre-war assessments. The FSB’s Fifth Service was responsible for intelligence work in Ukraine, and it reportedly told the Kremlin that Ukraine’s government would fall quickly and that many Ukrainians would welcome Russian troops.

Andrei Soldatov, a Russian investigative journalist who has written several books on the security services with his colleague Irina Borogan, explained the problem to The Times. In his view, it is too risky for superiors to tell Putin what he doesn’t want to hear, so reports get shaped to please the boss somewhere in the chain of command.

In March 2022 Soldatov also reported that Sergei Beseda, head of the Fifth Service, and his deputy had been placed under house arrest. A US official called that report credible, but Russia never confirmed it. Later in 2022, US and other intelligence officials doubted Beseda had been jailed, and he was seen at a public event in Moscow in January 2023. He later moved on to an advisory role at the FSB. The episode shows how hard it is to judge purges inside a closed system from the outside.

The numbers at the time, and why they varied so much

Casualty figures in March 2022 were especially unreliable. Ukrainian officials claimed Russia had lost more than 12,000 soldiers by the middle of the month. Russia’s own early official figures were in the hundreds, far lower than any outside estimate, and Moscow updated them rarely. Western estimates fell somewhere in between. Thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians had also been killed, though exact totals were impossible to establish in the chaos.

The lesson is that early wartime numbers from any side should be read as claims rather than counts. Later research, by independent journalists and analysts, has generally given a clearer picture than the figures released in the first weeks.

Was Russia really failing?

At the time, some commentators warned against writing Russia off. Ukraine is a large country with a population of over 40 million, and Russia still had far greater firepower, especially in artillery and air power. Several observers expected Russian forces to regroup and press harder on major cities.

What actually happened was a turning point. Ukraine blocked the main routes into Kyiv by 18 March, and its counterattacks retook towns around the capital. In late March and early April Russia withdrew its forces from the Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy and Zhytomyr regions altogether, and Ukrainian troops entering towns such as Bucha found evidence of atrocities against civilians. Moscow then shifted its main effort to the east and south of Ukraine. Peace talks held during March, including a round in Istanbul, did not produce an agreement.

How to read claims like this

Stories about leaders sacking generals or jailing spies are common in wartime, and they are often hard to check. A few habits help:

  • Note who is making the claim and what they might gain from it.
  • Look for confirmation from independent journalists, named officials on the other side, or documented changes in command.
  • Separate the specific detail (eight generals) from the broader trend (a struggling campaign), which may be well supported even when the detail is not.
  • Check back months later; wartime rumours are often corrected or confirmed only after the fact.

In this case, the broad trend was right: Russia’s early plan had failed, and its leadership was looking for people to blame. The specific claim of eight dismissed generals remains unconfirmed.

Sources: Danilov’s comments as reported by The Times and MSN (March 2022). Background: Wikipedia: Oleksiy Danilov; Wikipedia: Andrei Soldatov; Wikipedia: Sergei Beseda; Wikipedia: Kyiv offensive (2022); Wikipedia: Russian generals killed during the invasion of Ukraine.

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