Why Germany Refused a Greek Call for an Arms Embargo on Turkey

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Originally published 2020-12-27.

In December 2020 Germany turned down Greece's call for a European arms embargo on Turkey. In an interview with the German Press Agency (dpa) on 23 December, Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said an embargo against a NATO partner was not strategically right, and warned that cutting Turkey off could push it to buy weapons from Russia instead. At the heart of the dispute were six German-designed submarines being built in Turkey, which Athens feared could change the naval balance in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Here is why Greece asked, why Berlin said no, and how the question played out afterwards.

Germany's 2020 Position on Arms Sales to Turkey

Why Greece wanted an embargo

Throughout 2020 tensions between Greece, Cyprus and Turkey rose sharply over energy exploration in waters claimed by more than one country. In August Turkey sent a seismic survey ship, escorted by warships, into areas Greece considers part of its continental shelf. Greek and Turkish frigates shadowed each other, and in one incident two of them collided. Cyprus, meanwhile, objected to Turkish drilling inside its exclusive economic zone.

Ahead of the EU leaders' summit of 10 and 11 December 2020, Greece asked its partners to stop selling weapons to Turkey, arguing that those arms could one day be used against EU members. The most sensitive item was a submarine programme with deep German roots.

The submarines in question

In 2009 Turkey signed a contract worth about €2 billion with a consortium led by Germany's Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW), part of ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, to build six Reis-class submarines. They are based on the German Type 214 design and are assembled at Turkey's Gölcük naval shipyard, with key packages supplied from Germany. Their air-independent propulsion lets them stay submerged far longer than older diesel boats, which is why Greece, whose navy also operates Type 214 submarines, saw them as a serious upgrade for its neighbour.

What Heiko Maas said

In the dpa interview Maas said he did not consider the demand for an arms embargo against Turkey "strategically correct." He pointed out that it is not easy to impose one on a NATO ally, and cited Turkey's purchase of Russian air-defence missiles after it could not get them from the United States. He also said that Germany had spent months trying to calm the dispute through diplomacy, with less success than hoped, and that the EU's decision to prepare sanctions would be followed.

His wider point was that Germany wanted to keep Turkey anchored in the West. Permanently shutting a NATO partner out of arms cooperation, he argued, would not serve that goal.

The Russian missile precedent

The example Maas used was real and recent. Turkey had wanted a long-range air-defence system, and talks with the US over Patriot missiles stalled. In 2017 Ankara instead agreed to buy Russia's S-400 system, and the first deliveries arrived in July 2019. Washington responded by removing Turkey from the F-35 fighter programme, and on 14 December 2020, days before the Maas interview, the US imposed sanctions on Turkey's defence procurement agency under a law aimed at countries buying major Russian weapons.

For Berlin, that sequence showed the risk of refusing to sell: Turkey would not go without weapons, it would simply buy them elsewhere, and the West would lose influence.

Why critics were unconvinced

Greek and Cypriot officials, human-rights groups and many European lawmakers saw it differently. They listed a series of Turkish actions they said justified tougher measures:

  • Syria: Turkey's October 2019 offensive into Kurdish-held northeast Syria was condemned by several European governments, and some, including Germany, restricted new arms export licences at the time. Kurdish officials and aid groups accused Turkey and allied forces of disrupting the Alouk water station that supplied hundreds of thousands of people.
  • Libya: Turkey backed the Tripoli-based government with drones, advisers and Syrian fighters, a deployment that put it at odds with France and others.
  • Nagorno-Karabakh: During the autumn 2020 war, Turkey supported Azerbaijan with drones and, according to several governments and monitoring groups, helped bring in Syrian mercenaries; Ankara denied sending fighters.
  • Press freedom at home: The Committee to Protect Journalists' 2020 census ranked Turkey among the world's worst jailers of journalists, second only to China, after years of arrests following the failed 2016 coup attempt.

Critics argued that Germany's commercial interests, especially the submarine contract, weighed heavily in its decision.

The Cyprus dimension

For Cyprus the issue is personal. Turkey has occupied the northern third of the island since its 1974 invasion and is the only country to recognise the breakaway administration there. Nicosia sees Turkish naval activity in its waters as a continuation of that occupation, and Greece, one of the island's three guarantor powers under the 1960 independence treaties, links its own defence planning to the island.

What happened next

At the December 2020 summit EU leaders agreed to prepare limited sanctions on individuals linked to Turkish drilling, but no arms embargo. Over the following years Greek-Turkish relations went through cycles of tension and thaw; after the February 2023 earthquakes in Turkey, Greek rescue teams and aid helped open a calmer period, and the two governments resumed high-level talks.

The submarine programme went ahead. The first boat, Piri Reis, was commissioned in August 2024, with more following. Greece, for its part, has invested heavily in its own forces, buying French Rafale fighters and Belharra-class frigates and signing up for US F-35s.

Key takeaways

The December 2020 decision showed the balance Germany tries to strike: solidarity with EU members Greece and Cyprus on one side, and on the other a strategic and commercial relationship with Turkey, a NATO member that controls the Bosphorus and hosts millions of refugees. Maas's argument rested on a simple calculation, that keeping Turkey dependent on Western weapons gives Europe more leverage than cutting it off. Whether that calculation was right remains one of the long-running debates in European security.

Sources: German Federal Foreign Office: Maas interview with dpa; Al-Monitor; Wikipedia: Reis-class submarine; Arab News (CPJ 2020 census).

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