Russia Pledged Help to Armenia, but Not in Nagorno-Karabakh

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Originally published 2020-11-05.

On 31 October 2020, five weeks into the war over Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia told Armenia it would give “all necessary assistance” if the fighting reached Armenia’s own territory. The promise was real but narrow: it did not cover Nagorno-Karabakh itself, where almost all of the fighting was taking place. That distinction shaped the rest of the war and explains why Russian troops did not join it.

Russia's 2020 Statement on Support for Armenia

Vladimir Putin and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan at a 2018 meeting. Photo: kremlin.ru

What Moscow promised, and what it left out

The statement came from Russia’s Foreign Ministry in reply to a letter Pashinyan sent to Vladimir Putin the same day. Pashinyan asked for urgent consultations on security help. He warned that the violence was creeping towards Armenia’s borders and that Turkey was backing Azerbaijan, and he invoked the 1997 Russian–Armenian treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance.

Moscow’s answer was carefully worded. Russia, it said, would render Yerevan all necessary assistance “if clashes take place directly on the territory of Armenia.” Nothing in the reply extended that guarantee to Nagorno-Karabakh, which the world, Russia included, recognises as part of Azerbaijan even though it was then run by an ethnic-Armenian administration that called the region Artsakh.

Why Nagorno-Karabakh fell outside Russia’s guarantee

Russia’s obligations to Armenia rest on two foundations. The first is the 1997 bilateral treaty, which provides for mutual assistance if either side faces a military threat and underpins Russia’s 102nd Military Base in Gyumri, about 120 km north of Yerevan, where roughly 3,000 Russian soldiers are officially stationed. The second is the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Moscow-led alliance whose Article 4 says members will help any member that suffers aggression. Armenia is a member; Azerbaijan is not.

Both commitments apply to Armenia’s internationally recognised borders. Earlier in October Putin had said plainly that Russia’s CSTO duties did not include Nagorno-Karabakh. Moscow also sells weapons to both countries and wanted to stay on working terms with Baku and with Ankara. The 31 October statement restated that position rather than changing it.

The limits were visible on the ground. When Azerbaijani forces struck targets inside Armenia on 14 October, Russia did not intervene, according to accounts of the war compiled from multiple reports.

The war at the time of the pledge

Fighting had broken out on 27 September 2020 with an Azerbaijani offensive along the line of contact, and quickly escalated to heavy artillery, rockets and drones. By the end of October at least 1,000 people had been confirmed killed, and Russian officials estimated that the real toll on both sides could be as high as 5,000.

Three ceasefires collapsed almost at once. A humanitarian truce agreed in Moscow on 10 October broke down within hours, a second attempt around 17 October fared no better, and a US-brokered ceasefire on 26 October lasted only minutes. On 30 October the two foreign ministers met mediators from the OSCE Minsk Group (Russia, France and the United States) in Geneva; they agreed to exchange bodies and lists of prisoners, but not to stop shooting. The next day both sides accused each other of shelling residential areas, including Stepanakert’s central market and the town of Shusha.

Azerbaijan’s condition for peace was the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the region. Many Karabakh Armenians feared what would follow, a fear rooted in the 1915 genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and in the violence of the late Soviet period.

Turkey’s role and the Syrian fighters

Turkey openly backed Azerbaijan politically and provided military advisers, and drones supplied by Turkey and Israel gave Azerbaijani forces a decisive edge. Throughout the war there were also reports that Turkey had helped bring Syrian fighters to the front. Armenia, France and Russia all raised the issue, and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights later documented at least 541 Syrian fighters killed. Baku denied using foreign fighters.

Some reports named factions of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, including the Hamza Division, which had earlier sent fighters to Libya. Which units went to Azerbaijan, and in what numbers, was never independently confirmed. The Hamza Division’s record elsewhere is better documented: in August 2023 the United States sanctioned it and its leader over abuses in northern Syria, including abduction and rape.

Armenia also accused Turkey of providing air support and logistics, and claimed a Turkish F-16 shot down one of its jets, which Ankara denied.

An older war over the same land

The conflict began as the Soviet Union came apart. From 1988, Karabakh Armenians campaigned to join Armenia, and the dispute escalated into a full war between the newly independent states. By the 1994 ceasefire Armenian forces held Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding Azerbaijani districts. Estimates of the dead in that first war range from about 17,000 to more than 30,000, and hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis and Armenians were driven from their homes. For the next 26 years the front line stayed frozen, punctuated by deadly clashes such as those in April 2016.

How the war ended, and what came after

Russia’s narrow guarantee was never triggered. Azerbaijani forces took the strategic town of Shusha (Shushi in Armenian) on 8 November, and a Russian-brokered ceasefire signed on 9 November took effect the next day. Armenia agreed to hand back the surrounding districts, Azerbaijan regained about three-quarters of the disputed territory, and just under 2,000 Russian peacekeepers deployed along the remaining line and the Lachin corridor. Official military deaths were 3,825 on the Armenian side and 2,906 on the Azerbaijani side, with figures widely believed to be undercounts.

The settlement did not last. In September 2023 a swift Azerbaijani offensive brought the whole region under Baku’s control, and more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians, nearly the entire population, fled to Armenia. The separatist administration dissolved itself, and Russian peacekeepers withdrew in 2024. Armenia, frustrated that neither Russia nor the CSTO had come to its aid, froze its participation in the alliance.

The October 2020 statement is a useful lesson in reading security guarantees: the precise words, and the map they refer to, decide what a promise is worth.

Sources: RFE/RL, 31 October 2020: Russia says it will help Armenia if fighting spreads to its territory; Wikipedia: Second Nagorno-Karabakh War; Wikipedia: 102nd Military Base; Wikipedia: Hamza Division; Wikipedia: First Nagorno-Karabakh War; RT, 31 October 2020: Russian Foreign Ministry statement on Armenia. Photo: Presidential Executive Office of Russia (kremlin.ru).

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