Originally published 2020-11-22.

In November 2020, days after the guns fell silent in Nagorno-Karabakh, the European policy site Modern Diplomacy published an opinion piece by journalist Uzay Bulut arguing that abuses against Armenians during the war must not go unpunished. Her core claims were that Azerbaijani forces and Syrian fighters brought in with Turkish help had committed war crimes, and that if the world looked away, other regimes would conclude they could do the same.
That call for accountability was not an isolated voice. Human rights groups, the French president and UN experts all raised serious concerns during and after the 44-day war. This article sets out what was documented, what was alleged, how the ceasefire changed the region, and what happened next, up to the end of the Armenian presence in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023.
The war in brief
Nagorno-Karabakh, called Artsakh by Armenians, is a mountainous region inside Azerbaijan's internationally recognised borders that had an ethnic Armenian majority. After a war in the early 1990s, Armenian forces controlled the region and seven surrounding Azerbaijani districts, and a self-declared republic ran it with Armenia's backing.
Fighting broke out again on 27 September 2020. Azerbaijan, armed with Turkish and Israeli drones and backed politically and militarily by Turkey, advanced through the southern districts and in early November captured the historic town of Shusha (Shushi), which overlooks the regional capital, Stepanakert. Official figures later put military deaths at about 3,825 on the Armenian side and 2,906 on the Azerbaijani side, and both sides reported around a hundred civilians killed each. Both governments are thought to have played down their own losses.
What the 10 November ceasefire said
A Russian-brokered agreement signed by Azerbaijan's Ilham Aliyev, Armenia's Nikol Pashinyan and Russia's Vladimir Putin ended the fighting at midnight Moscow time on 10 November. Its main points:
- Armenia handed back the districts around Nagorno-Karabakh that it had held since the 1990s, on a set timetable ending on 1 December 2020.
- Azerbaijan kept the areas it had taken in the fighting, including Shusha.
- Just under 2,000 Russian peacekeepers deployed along the line of contact and the Lachin corridor, the road linking the region to Armenia, for at least five years.
- Prisoners of war and the bodies of the dead were to be exchanged, and transport links were to open between Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave.
For many Armenians the deal felt like a capitulation. On the night it was announced, angry crowds stormed government buildings and the parliament in Yerevan, and the speaker of parliament, Ararat Mirzoyan, was beaten. Pashinyan defended the deal as the only way to avoid a total military collapse and later won a snap election in June 2021.
Evidence of abuses
Modern Diplomacy's article was written as advocacy, but several independent bodies documented serious violations of the laws of war.
- Killings of captives and mutilation. In December 2020 Amnesty International said it had verified videos showing Azerbaijani soldiers beheading Armenian captives and desecrating bodies, and called for urgent, impartial investigations. Columbia University's Institute for the Study of Human Rights also described mutilations and beheadings by Azerbaijani forces and their proxies.
- Attacks on towns. Azerbaijan shelled Stepanakert with rocket artillery and cluster munitions, which are banned under a treaty neither country has joined. Armenian forces fired missiles at the Azerbaijani city of Ganja, killing civilians in residential streets, and cluster munitions were used by both sides.
- Cultural heritage. Ghazanchetsots Cathedral in Shusha was hit twice in October 2020. Researchers had already documented the systematic destruction of medieval Armenian cemeteries and carved cross-stones (khachkars) in Azerbaijan's Nakhchivan region, which critics describe as cultural erasure.
Amnesty was clear that war crimes were committed by both Azerbaijani and Armenian forces. Calling for accountability is not the same as a court verdict: individual cases still need investigation and, where evidence is strong, prosecution. Azerbaijan said in December 2020 that it had arrested four of its own servicemen over abuses.
Syrian fighters and Turkey's role
The most internationally sensitive allegation concerned the use of fighters recruited in Syria. Early in the war, at an EU summit in Brussels on 1 October 2020, French President Emmanuel Macron said France had information that Syrian fighters from jihadist groups had passed through the Turkish city of Gaziantep on their way to the front. He called it "a very serious new fact, which changes the situation."
On 11 November 2020 the UN Working Group on the use of mercenaries said there were widespread reports that Azerbaijan, with Turkey's assistance, had relied on Syrian fighters, apparently motivated by money given the economic collapse in Syria, and that relatives were reportedly promised compensation and Turkish citizenship if they were killed. The experts noted that similar allegations had been made earlier the same year about Turkey's recruitment of Syrians for the war in Libya. Among the factions named in media reports was the Hamza Division, part of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, which has itself been accused of abuses in northern Syria.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights counted at least 541 Syrian fighters killed in the conflict. Azerbaijan and Turkey denied using foreign fighters.
Why the call for accountability mattered
The central argument of the Modern Diplomacy piece was about precedent. When atrocities go unpunished, the reasoning goes, others draw lessons. The world's failure to act in Rwanda in 1994 and in Bosnia in the early 1990s is often cited in exactly this way. Armenians have special reason to be alert: the Armenian Genocide of 1915 to 1923, in which Ottoman authorities killed up to 1.5 million Armenians, has never been acknowledged by Turkey, and Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh warned in 2020 that they feared a new round of expulsions or killings.
Some legal routes did open. Armenia and Azerbaijan each brought cases against the other at the International Court of Justice in 2021 under the convention against racial discrimination, and the court ordered both to prevent incitement and protect detainees. The European Court of Human Rights also received thousands of applications linked to the war. These processes are slow, and few individual perpetrators have faced trial.
What happened next: 2023
The 2020 ceasefire did not settle the conflict. From December 2022 the Lachin corridor was blocked, causing severe shortages in the region. On 19 September 2023 Azerbaijan launched a one-day military offensive that ended in a truce the following day. On 28 September the region's leader, Samvel Shakhramanyan, signed a decree dissolving the self-declared republic's institutions by 1 January 2024. Within about a week nearly 100,000 ethnic Armenians, close to the entire population of around 120,000, had fled to Armenia.
For readers looking back at the 2020 debate, the outcome is sobering. The fears voiced in November 2020 about the safety of the Armenian population were followed, three years later, by the near-total departure of that population. Whether anyone will be held legally responsible for abuses in either war remains an open question.
Sources: Uzay Bulut, Modern Diplomacy, 13 November 2020; Wikipedia, 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war; Wikipedia, 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement; Amnesty International, December 2020; Hyperallergic on Nakhchivan heritage; The New Arab; Meduza.

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