Originally published 2020-11-22.

In A Promised Land, the first volume of his presidential memoirs, Barack Obama argues that European leaders told their voters only half the story of the Greek debt crisis. He writes that the leaders of Germany and France focused on the failings of Greek governments while rarely mentioning that their own countries' banks were among Greece's largest lenders, and that rescuing Greece was also a way of protecting those banks. He also makes clear that he thought Europe's insistence on austerity was a mistake.
Here is what he wrote, how it fits the facts of the crisis, and how to read a memoir like this as a historical source.
What Obama says about Greece
The book was published on 17 November 2020 and covers Obama's life up to the killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011. It sold more than 1.7 million copies in North America in its first week, a record for a presidential memoir. A large part of one chapter deals with the euro crisis, which hit just as his administration was hoping the American economy would recover.
He describes his frustration with what he calls the stubborn embrace of austerity by key European leaders, and he admits that, before 2010, the situation in Europe had not been keeping him awake. Greece changed that. Summing up how his planned "Recovery Summer" was derailed, he writes simply: "Except Greece imploded."
The passage that drew most attention in Greece concerns how German and French politicians explained the bailouts at home:
"I noticed that they rarely mentioned that German and French banks were some of Greece's biggest lenders," he writes. He adds that much of Greece's borrowing had gone on buying German and French exports, which would have shown voters that saving Greece also meant saving their own banks and industries.
He then offers a possible motive for the silence: "Maybe they worried that such an admission would turn voter attention away from failures of successive Greek governments." The scrutiny, he suggests, might then have turned to the officials who had been responsible for supervising how those banks lent money.
How the Greek debt crisis unfolded
Greece's crisis grew out of the global financial crash of 2007 and 2008, which began in the American housing and banking sector. In late 2009, a new Greek government revealed that the country's deficit and debt were far larger than previously reported. Its debt was later put at about 127% of GDP in 2009. Lenders lost confidence, borrowing costs soared, and by 2010 Greece could no longer finance itself on the markets.
Three rescue programmes followed:
- May 2010: a three-year loan of €110 billion from eurozone countries and the International Monetary Fund.
- 2012: a second programme, which also included a large write-down for private bondholders.
- July 2015: a third programme, agreed days after Greeks voted against the creditors' terms in a referendum.
Each loan came with conditions: deep cuts in public spending, tax rises, pension reductions and privatisations. Greece finally left the last programme on 20 August 2018.
The human and economic cost
The numbers explain why austerity remains such a raw subject in Greece. The economy shrank from about €242 billion in 2008 to €179 billion in 2014, a fall of roughly a quarter, which is a contraction more often associated with war or depression than with a modern European democracy. Debt as a share of GDP rose rather than fell, reaching about 177% in 2014, partly because the economy it was measured against was shrinking so fast.
Unemployment climbed above 25% in the middle of the decade, and youth unemployment passed 50%. Researchers and charities also reported rising homelessness and a worrying increase in suicides during the worst years, although exact figures vary between studies. For many families, the crisis meant emigration of their children, lost savings and years of insecurity.
The banks behind the bailouts
Obama's central point, that European banks outside Greece were heavily exposed, is not controversial among economists. In mid-2011, foreign European banks held tens of billions of euros of Greek debt; by early 2015 that exposure had largely been moved off their books, while most of what Greece owed was now held by eurozone governments and their rescue funds. Germany, France and Italy were the largest contributors to those funds.
Critics in Greece and elsewhere have long argued that this shift is the real story of the bailouts: the money lent to Athens largely flowed back to creditors, while the cost of adjustment fell on Greek workers, pensioners and taxpayers. Supporters of the programmes reply that Greece's own budget problems were real and serious, and that without the loans the collapse would have been even worse. Obama's account sits closer to the first view, without excusing Greek governments.
The 2015 referendum and the limits of choice
In January 2015, Greeks elected a SYRIZA-led government that promised to end austerity. On 5 July 2015, about 61% of voters rejected the creditors' proposed terms. Within days, however, with banks closed and capital controls in place, the government signed a third programme on terms close to those voters had turned down.
One reason Greece had so little room to manoeuvre is that, as a member of the euro, it could not devalue its own currency or set its own interest rates. Countries with their own currency can soften a crisis by letting the exchange rate fall; Greece had to adjust through wages and spending instead, which deepened the recession.
Reading a president's memoir as a source
A memoir is valuable because it shows how a central participant understood events, but it is also written with hindsight and from one point of view. A few things are worth keeping in mind:
- It is an interpretation. Obama is describing his own impressions of what European leaders said and why, not quoting their private reasoning.
- His influence was limited. The United States was not a eurozone member and could push for stimulus and debt relief mainly through persuasion and its weight in the IMF.
- Other accounts exist. Memoirs and interviews from European officials, Greek ministers and IMF staff describe the same years differently, and reading them side by side gives a fuller picture.
Even with those caveats, it is striking that the most powerful political leader of the time thought the European approach to Greece was misguided and said so in print. Whether he could, or should, have done more to change it remains an open question.
Sources: Pappas Post: A Promised Land, Obama and the Greek debt crisis; Wikipedia: A Promised Land; Wikipedia: Greek government-debt crisis.

COMMENTS