Why the October 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh Ceasefire Collapsed

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Originally published 2020-10-12.

October 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh Ceasefire Was Followed by Renewed Fighting

Photo: Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.

The humanitarian ceasefire agreed by Armenia and Azerbaijan in Moscow on 10 October 2020 broke down almost as soon as it began. It was due to take effect at noon that day, but within hours both sides were reporting artillery fire, Armenian officials said Azerbaijani forces had shelled towns in Nagorno-Karabakh (called Artsakh by Armenians), and heavy fighting continued around Hadrut in the south. Each government blamed the other.

The truce had a narrow purpose: to pause the fighting so that prisoners and the bodies of the dead could be exchanged, with help from the International Committee of the Red Cross, and to open a door to wider talks. It did neither. The war went on for another month and ended only in November, on terms that reshaped the region.

What was agreed in Moscow

The war had started on 27 September 2020, the most serious fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh since the early 1990s. After nearly two weeks of drone strikes, artillery and ground offensives, Russia invited the two foreign ministers to Moscow. Russia has a military alliance with Armenia and close economic and political ties with Azerbaijan, which made it the obvious broker.

After roughly ten hours of talks, Russia announced the deal in the early hours of 10 October. It covered three things: a ceasefire on humanitarian grounds, exchanges of prisoners and remains mediated by the Red Cross, and a promise to begin “substantive” negotiations.

What it did not include was any mechanism to monitor the line of contact, any agreement on who should hold which territory, or any timetable. Without those, a ceasefire depends entirely on both armies choosing to stop, and neither did.

How the truce collapsed

By the afternoon of 10 October the Armenian side was reporting Azerbaijani shelling of settlements, and fighting was described in the Hadrut area, which Azerbaijani forces were trying to capture. Baku accused Armenian forces of firing on Azerbaijani positions and towns. Independent journalists had limited access to the front, so many individual claims from that day could not be confirmed.

Before dawn on 11 October, a missile strike hit a residential area of Ganja, Azerbaijan’s second-largest city, killing around ten civilians; Azerbaijan blamed Armenia, which denied responsibility. Stepanakert, the main city of Nagorno-Karabakh, continued to come under fire. Churches had already been hit before the truce: the Ghazanchetsots Cathedral in Shusha was struck twice on 8 October, an attack later examined by Human Rights Watch as a possible war crime.

A second humanitarian ceasefire was announced for 18 October, and a third, after talks in Washington, for 26 October. Both broke down within hours, just like the first.

What both sides were saying

Even as diplomats spoke of a pause, statements from the two capitals showed how far apart they were. In an interview with Al Jazeera on 2 October, President Ilham Aliyev said of the Armenian forces: “they need to leave our territory, and then, the war will stop”. He also accused the Armenian government of overestimating international support and of provoking the conflict.

In practice, that meant Azerbaijan would accept no settlement in which Armenian forces kept the districts around Nagorno-Karabakh, and possibly the region itself. For Armenians, withdrawal raised a different fear. Nagorno-Karabakh’s population was overwhelmingly ethnically Armenian and Christian, and many saw their security there through the lens of the Armenian Genocide of 1915–1923 and of the pogroms against Armenians in Sumgait and Baku at the end of the Soviet era.

Armenia’s Foreign Ministry, for its part, in a statement on 3 October, accused Azerbaijan’s leadership of crimes against the people of Artsakh and of bringing foreign fighters into the region, warning that it would “pay a high price”.

Foreign fighters and the wider background

From late September, several outlets, including Reuters, the Guardian and the BBC, reported that Turkey, Azerbaijan’s closest ally, had helped bring Syrian fighters from Turkish-backed factions such as the Hamza Division to fight for Azerbaijan. France and Russia said the same. Turkey and Azerbaijan denied it. A UN commission of inquiry had separately said that some Turkish-backed Syrian factions might have committed war crimes, including torture and rape, in northern Syria.

The conflict also had a cultural dimension. In the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan, thousands of medieval Armenian cross-stones at the Julfa cemetery and other Armenian monuments were destroyed between the late 1990s and 2006, a campaign documented by researchers Simon Maghakyan and Sarah Pickman, who quoted critics describing it as worse than heritage destruction by ISIS. That history shaped Armenian fears for the churches and monasteries of Nagorno-Karabakh itself.

How the war ended, and what followed

The fighting stopped only after Azerbaijani forces took the strategic hilltop town of Shusha (Shushi to Armenians) in early November. On the night of 9–10 November 2020, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia signed a trilateral statement. Armenia handed over the districts around Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan kept the areas it had captured, and about 2,000 Russian peacekeepers were deployed along the Lachin corridor linking the remaining Armenian-held area to Armenia. Thousands of soldiers on both sides and many civilians had been killed in 44 days.

The arrangement did not last. From December 2022 the Lachin corridor was blocked, causing severe shortages. In September 2023 Azerbaijan launched a one-day offensive, the local Armenian authorities surrendered, and more than 100,000 Armenians, almost the entire population, left for Armenia within days. The self-declared Republic of Artsakh formally dissolved on 1 January 2024. Seen from today, the failed truce of October 2020 was an early sign that the conflict would be decided on the battlefield, not at the negotiating table.

Why ceasefires like this fail

Humanitarian ceasefires tend to hold when both sides gain more from stopping than from fighting, and when someone is watching the front line. In October 2020 neither condition was met. Azerbaijan was advancing and believed time was on its side, Armenian forces were trying to hold ground, and there were no monitors to establish who fired first. In those circumstances, a pause announced in a distant capital can collapse in an afternoon.

For readers following reports from any war, the lesson is to look for the sequence of events and the source of each claim. Statements from governments involved in a conflict are part of the story, but they are not the same as independent verification.

Sources: Wikipedia: 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war; Wikipedia: 2023 Azerbaijani offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh; Trend: Aliyev’s Al Jazeera interview (2 October 2020); Armenpress: Armenian Foreign Ministry statement (3 October 2020); Wikipedia: Timeline of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war; Wikipedia: Ghazanchetsots Cathedral; RFE/RL via GlobalSecurity: Syrian fighters; Al Jazeera: UN experts on abuses in northern Syria; Hyperallergic (2019): Maghakyan and Pickman on Nakhichevan.

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