Originally published 2020-08-30.
In mid-August 2020 Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan warned Athens that any attack on the Turkish seismic survey ship Oruç Reis would cost Greece dearly. He said it a day after a Greek frigate and one of the Turkish warships escorting the survey vessel touched at sea. Behind the brief, angry line sat a much older argument over who owns the seabed, and the gas that might lie under it, in the Eastern Mediterranean.

What Erdoğan said, and when
The Oruç Reis is an 87-metre research ship owned by Turkey’s state mineral exploration agency, MTA. On 10 August 2020 Ankara sent it back to work in waters south of the Greek island of Kastellorizo, after a pause in July. A small flotilla of Turkish naval vessels went with it, and Greek warships shadowed the group.
On 13 August Erdoğan spoke publicly about the operation. His words were widely reported:
“We have told Greece if you attack our Oruc Reis, you will pay a heavy price. And they got their first answer today.”
He did not explain what the “first answer” was. Most observers read it as a reference to the encounter between the two navies the day before, which Ankara called a provocation and Athens called an accident.
The frigate collision behind the warning
On 12 August the Greek frigate Limnos was sailing near the survey ship when it came close to the Turkish frigate Kemal Reis, one of the escorts. According to a Greek defence source quoted by Reuters, the Greek ship turned to avoid a head-on collision and its bow touched the stern of the Turkish vessel. Greek Defence Minister Nikos Panagiotopoulos publicly praised the Limnos commander. Neither side published a full account of any damage.
No shots were fired and nobody was hurt, but the episode showed how thin the margin for error had become with dozens of warships in a small area. Around the same time, Greek media carried reports, attributed to unnamed naval sources, that Greek ships had detected Turkish submarines near Greek waters and pushed them away with sonar. Those reports were never independently confirmed and should be treated with caution.
Why the waters south of Kastellorizo are disputed
Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, islands can generate their own continental shelf and exclusive economic zone. Greece argues that its islands, including tiny Kastellorizo just two kilometres off the Turkish coast, carry those rights. Turkey has not ratified the convention and argues that small islands sitting close to its mainland should not cut it off from most of the sea in front of its own shoreline. The area where the Oruç Reis worked lies exactly where those two readings overlap.
Cyprus adds a second layer. In July 1974 a coup backed by the military junta then ruling Greece overthrew the Cypriot president, Archbishop Makarios. Turkey invaded five days later and, after a second offensive in August, occupied roughly 36–37% of the island, which Turkish troops still hold. Between about 140,000 and 200,000 Greek Cypriots were displaced. The breakaway “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”, declared in 1983, is recognised only by Turkey, and UN Security Council Resolution 541 called the declaration legally invalid. Turkey does not recognise the Republic of Cyprus’s maritime zones either, and has sent drill ships into waters Cyprus licensed to international energy firms.
Older disputes over airspace, Aegean islets and the militarisation of islands have kept relations tense for decades, even though both countries are NATO members.
Energy, politics and the Greece–Egypt deal
Large gas finds off Egypt, Israel and Cyprus over the past fifteen years raised the stakes. Ankara presents its surveys as a defence of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot rights; critics see them as a way to press maritime claims by creating facts on the water, and argue that a firm stance plays well with Erdoğan’s nationalist and conservative voters at a time of economic strain. Greece and the European Union both reject Turkey’s right to explore in waters they regard as Greek or Cypriot.
In November 2019 Turkey signed a maritime memorandum with Libya’s Tripoli-based government that drew a line across areas Greece claims. Greece answered on 6 August 2020 by signing its own partial maritime boundary agreement with Egypt, a regional rival of Ankara. Turkey called the Greek–Egyptian deal void and, within days, sent the Oruç Reis back out.
That move ended a short German mediation effort. In July, after talks encouraged by Chancellor Angela Merkel, Turkey had put the survey on hold. Merkel kept urging both governments to settle their differences through dialogue and international law, and she spoke with Erdoğan again by phone in mid-August, but the window that had briefly opened in July was shut.
France steps in, and the EU weighs sanctions
France took the hardest line among EU governments. President Emmanuel Macron had already called in July for EU sanctions over Turkish activity in Greek and Cypriot waters. On 13 August he announced that France would temporarily reinforce its military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean in cooperation with European partners, including Greece. French officials framed the deployment as a way to watch the situation and show support for international law.
Greece, Cyprus and France pushed for tough EU measures against Turkey over the following weeks. Other member states, Germany among them, preferred to keep talks alive, and the question was put to an EU summit that was eventually postponed to 1–2 October 2020.
How the 2020 standoff cooled
The confrontation never turned into open conflict. In September Turkey recalled the Oruç Reis to port, saying it wanted to give diplomacy room before the EU summit. On 22 September, after a video call between Erdoğan, Merkel and European Council President Charles Michel, Turkey and Greece announced they would resume “exploratory talks” on their maritime disputes. Those talks had stalled in 2016 after 60 rounds; a new round opened in Istanbul in January 2021.
The talks have not resolved the core questions. Who owns which stretch of seabed, and how much weight small islands should carry, remain unsettled, and both sides still describe the other’s claims as unlawful.
Reading the warning today
Erdoğan’s “heavy price” line is best understood as a political signal in a negotiation conducted partly through warships. It records Turkey’s position in August 2020; it does not settle the legal status of the waters, and it was not followed by any Turkish attack on Greek forces. For readers following the region, a few points help make sense of later headlines:
- Most flare-ups follow a pattern: a Turkish navigational notice (NAVTEX) for a survey, a Greek counter-notice, naval shadowing, then talks.
- Cyprus is never far from the story, because its divided status shapes every maritime claim around the island.
- Energy companies need legal certainty before investing, so unresolved boundaries tend to delay real drilling more than they speed it up.
The 2020 crisis showed how quickly a survey mission can become a test of alliances, with France, Egypt and the EU drawn in. It also showed that, for now, both Athens and Ankara prefer brinkmanship that stops short of a shooting war.
Sources: Wikipedia: RV MTA Oruç Reis; The Greek Herald (with Reuters): defence minister congratulates frigate captain, August 2020; The Week, 13 August 2020: France squares up to Turkey in the Mediterranean; Cyprus Mail (Reuters), 22 September 2020: Turkey, Greece agree to resume talks after four years; Bloomberg, 6 August 2020: Egypt and Greece sign maritime border deal; Wikipedia: Turkish invasion of Cyprus; dpa International: Erdogan warns Greece of heavy price over gas exploration vessel.

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