Goldman Sachs Asked If Curing Patients Is a Sustainable Business

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Originally published 2018-04-28.

In April 2018 a Goldman Sachs research note on gene therapy asked its investor clients a blunt question: "Is curing patients a sustainable business model?" The note did not argue that cures are bad. It pointed out that a treatment given once and then finished earns far less recurring revenue than a drug taken for life, and it suggested ways biotech companies could cope with that. When CNBC reported the note, the question caused a storm of anger online. Here is what the report actually said, why the problem it describes is real, and what can be done about it.

Goldman Sachs's 2018 Discussion of Cure-Based Business Models

What the Goldman Sachs report said

The note was part of a report titled "The Genome Revolution", dated 10 April 2018 and written by biotech analyst Salveen Richter. It was sent to the bank's clients, not published, and CNBC described its contents on 11 April. Richter called "one-shot cures" one of the most attractive features of gene therapy, engineered cell therapy and gene editing. But she warned that such treatments could be a challenge for companies looking for sustained cash flow, because each cured patient stops being a customer.

The report then proposed three strategies for companies:

  • Go after large markets. Haemophilia A and B were cited as a worldwide market of roughly $9–10 billion a year, growing by about 6–7 percent annually.
  • Target conditions with high incidence. Spinal muscular atrophy, a genetic disease that destroys nerve cells in the spinal cord, was the example, because new patients are born every year.
  • Keep innovating. With hundreds of inherited retinal diseases still untreated, a steady pipeline of new programmes could make up for falling sales from older ones.

In other words, the note was investment advice about where companies selling cures should look for growth. It was not a recommendation to withhold cures.

The hepatitis C example

Richter's main case study was Gilead Sciences and its hepatitis C drugs based on sofosbuvir. When sofosbuvir was approved in the United States in December 2013, it changed the treatment of the disease: most patients could be cured in about twelve weeks, with cure rates above 90 percent. It was also famously expensive, at about $1,000 per pill, or around $84,000 for a course.

Gilead's US hepatitis C sales peaked at $12.5 billion in 2015. Then they fell, and Goldman expected them to drop below $4 billion in 2018. The reason was success: as patients were cured, the pool of people needing treatment shrank. With an infectious disease the effect is stronger, because cured people no longer pass on the virus, so fewer new cases appear. Richter noted that for diseases like cancer, where the number of new patients stays fairly stable, a cure is less of a threat to a company's revenue.

Seen this way, the hepatitis C story is good news for public health. A disease that once meant decades of liver damage became curable, and in poorer countries licensed generic versions brought the cost of a course down dramatically.

Why the question touched a nerve

Many people already suspected that the medical industry earns more from managing chronic illness than from ending it, so a major bank saying something similar out loud felt like confirmation. The reaction was understandable, but two points help put it in context.

First, analysts are paid to describe the financial reality for investors, not to decide what is ethical. Second, the cure-versus-management tension is genuine and not new. Economists sometimes compare it with the "boots theory" from Terry Pratchett's 1993 Discworld novel Men at Arms: a poor person who buys cheap boots that wear out ends up paying more over the years than someone who could afford one good pair. In medicine the equivalent is a patient who cannot pay for a one-time cure upfront but spends more in total on years of maintenance treatment.

Rare diseases and the price of a cure

The financial problem is sharpest for rare genetic conditions. Developing a new medicine and testing it in clinical trials until regulators approve it costs a great deal, often estimated in the hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars. When only a handful of patients exist each year, a company has to charge enormous sums per patient, or the treatment may never be made.

Two examples show the pattern. Strimvelis, a gene therapy for a severe immune disorder called ADA-SCID, was approved in Europe in 2016 at a price of €594,000. The condition affects only about 14 people a year in Europe, and by the time GlaxoSmithKline sold the therapy to Orchard Therapeutics in March 2018 it had been sold only five times. Zolgensma, a one-time gene therapy for spinal muscular atrophy, was approved in the United States in May 2019 with a list price of $2.125 million, at the time the most expensive medicine in the world.

Prices like these are a direct result of the dilemma the Goldman note described: when a treatment is given once, companies try to recover their costs and profits from that single sale.

Possible solutions

There is no single fix, but several approaches are being discussed or tried:

  • Public health systems. Countries with national health services can weigh a one-time cure against decades of treatment costs, and are often willing to pay because they save money in the long run. Private insurers, whose customers may switch plans, have less reason to think so far ahead.
  • Payment over time. Some health systems have experimented with spreading payments for gene therapies over several years, or linking them to whether the treatment keeps working.
  • Public and charitable funding. Governments and foundations already pay for much basic research. Extending that support into the costly clinical-trial stage could make treatments for rare diseases viable without sky-high prices.
  • Cheaper trials, carefully. Streamlining trials can cut costs, but safety rules exist for a reason. The thalidomide disaster of the late 1950s and early 1960s, when a medicine given to pregnant women caused thousands of severe birth defects, is the classic warning of what can happen when testing is too weak.

Myths and facts

Myth: Goldman Sachs said companies should stop curing people. The note discussed revenue risks and growth strategies; it did not recommend withholding cures.

Myth: the report was a secret leak. It was a client research note that CNBC reported on; it simply was not published online.

Fact: cures can shrink a market. Gilead's hepatitis C sales fell sharply because the drugs worked so well.

If you or someone you know is living with hepatitis C or a genetic condition, talk to a doctor about the treatments and support programmes available where you live.

Sources: CNBC, 11 April 2018; Wikipedia: Sofosbuvir; Wikipedia: Strimvelis; Wikipedia: Onasemnogene abeparvovec (Zolgensma); Wikipedia: Boots theory; IFLScience.

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