Why War on Want Says Private Military Companies Must Be Reined In

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Originally published 2016-05-30.

War on Want Video Argues Private Military Firms Profit From War

A short campaign film from the British charity War on Want makes a blunt argument: private companies that sell armed security and military services earn money from war and insecurity, and are far harder to hold to account than national armies. The film was shared widely in 2016, including in an article by Sophie McAdam for True Activist, and it is embedded below.

The question behind it remains live. Who is responsible when a hired guard opens fire, or a contract interrogator abuses a prisoner? This page explains what these firms are, how large the industry became, and what the courts have and have not done.

What the campaign film argues

War on Want, a London-based anti-poverty charity founded in 1951 (the name was coined by Harold Wilson, later Prime Minister), has published research on alleged human rights abuses by private military and security companies in Iraq and elsewhere. Its film presents three main points:

  • These companies, usually shortened to PMSCs, are paid by governments and corporations to operate in conflict zones.
  • Their business depends on continued instability, which gives them little incentive to see conflicts end.
  • Oversight is weak, so abuses by their staff often go unpunished.

It is an advocacy piece, so it does not try to present the industry’s own case. Companies argue that they fill gaps, protect aid workers and diplomats, and work under contract rules set by the governments that hire them. Both perspectives are useful for understanding the debate.

What private military and security companies are

A PMSC is a private business that provides armed security or military services. Its staff are generally called contractors; critics often call them mercenaries. Services range from guarding embassies, convoys and oil installations to logistics, training foreign forces, intelligence analysis and interrogation.

The modern industry took shape after the Cold War, when many armies shrank and experienced soldiers became available for hire. In the 1990s the South African firm Executive Outcomes fought for the Angolan government against UNITA and was hired to push back rebels in Sierra Leone. The British company Sandline International also became well known in that era.

More recently, Russia’s Wagner Group showed how a nominally private force can serve state goals. It has fought in Ukraine since 2022 and has been linked to operations in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique, along with allegations of serious abuses.

How big the industry grew

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan turned contracting into a very large business. One 2003 estimate put the industry’s annual revenue above $100 billion. By December 2006 an estimated 100,000 contractors were working directly for the US Department of Defense in Iraq, about ten times as many as during the 1991 Gulf War. In Afghanistan in late 2008 contractors made up 69% of Pentagon personnel, the highest share recorded in any US conflict.

Not all of those people carried weapons. Many cooked, drove trucks or maintained equipment. Still, the scale meant that armed contractors became a familiar sight, and their conduct shaped how local people saw the foreign presence.

The accountability gap

The film’s strongest argument concerns accountability. In occupied Iraq, a 2004 order from the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority, known as CPA Order 17, gave foreign contractors immunity from Iraqi law. That left prosecution to their home countries, which often lacked clear legal tools to act on crimes committed abroad.

The abuse at Abu Ghraib prison shows the problem. A 2005 investigation found contractors involved in 36% of the proven incidents, yet none was criminally prosecuted, while several US soldiers were court-martialled.

The original 2016 post claimed that private companies cannot be tried at all. That goes too far. Prosecutions and lawsuits are rare and slow, but they do happen.

When contractors did face the courts

Nisour Square, Baghdad, 2007

On 16 September 2007 Blackwater guards escorting a US embassy convoy opened fire in a busy Baghdad square. At least 14 Iraqi civilians were killed; Iraqi investigators put the toll at 17, with about 20 wounded. In October 2014 a US federal jury convicted four guards. Nicholas Slatten was found guilty of murder and later sentenced to life. Paul Slough, Evan Liberty and Dustin Heard were convicted of manslaughter and weapons charges and received 30-year terms, later roughly halved on appeal.

On 22 December 2020 President Donald Trump pardoned all four. Iraq’s foreign ministry said the decision ignored the seriousness of the crime, and victims’ families expressed outrage.

Abu Ghraib and CACI, 2024

In November 2024 a federal jury in Alexandria, Virginia, found the contractor CACI responsible for contributing to the mistreatment of three former Abu Ghraib detainees in 2003 and 2004. It awarded them $42 million in total. The case had been filed in 2008 and was the first time a US jury heard claims from Abu Ghraib survivors. CACI denied that its employees took part and said it would appeal.

Claims about Syria, Yemen and ISIS in context

The 2016 post introduced the film by discussing claims made by Vladimir Putin that the United States had funded and armed fighters in Syria who later defected to Islamic State along with their weapons. Those claims were never independently proven in the form Putin stated them, and they came from a leader whose own country was a party to the Syrian war.

Some related facts were reported openly at the time. The Guardian covered Western training of Syrian rebels in Jordan in 2013, and a new US training programme in 2015. In 2015 it also reported that the Pentagon could not fully account for weapons sent to Yemen. These reports show how hard it is to track arms in a war zone, but they concern governments rather than private contractors, and they do not by themselves confirm Putin’s wider allegations.

Efforts to regulate the industry

Two international instruments try to set rules. The UN Mercenary Convention, opened in 1989, had only 37 ratifying states by 2021, and most major military powers have not joined. The Montreux Document of 2008, developed by Switzerland and the International Committee of the Red Cross, restates the legal obligations of states that hire, host or license PMSCs. By the end of 2018, 54 states had signed it, but it is not a binding treaty.

For readers weighing the debate, a few practical questions help cut through slogans: Who hired the company, and under which country’s law does it operate? Can victims bring a case, and where? Does the contract require reporting of incidents? War on Want’s answer is that governments should regulate the industry tightly and stop outsourcing combat roles. Whatever one’s view, the record of Nisour Square, Abu Ghraib and Wagner shows why the question matters.

Sources: True Activist: original 2016 post by Sophie McAdam; War on Want campaign video (YouTube); Wikipedia: War on Want; Wikipedia: Private military company; Wikipedia: Nisour Square massacre; NPR via KPBS, 12 November 2024: Abu Ghraib verdict against CACI

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