
Wars almost never have a single cause. Historians and political scientists point to a tangle of factors: struggles for power and territory, weak or repressive governments, poverty and inequality, ethnic and religious divisions, and competition over resources such as land, water and oil. Over the past two decades a newer question has joined the debate. Can climate change, drought and the way we farm push fragile societies over the edge?
The short answer from current research is that environmental stress can raise the risk of conflict, especially where tensions already exist, but it is rarely the main cause on its own. Here is what the evidence says, where popular claims go too far, and why the farming argument made by activists such as Vandana Shiva is worth understanding even if you do not accept all of it.
The Syria question that started the debate
On 23 November 2015, in an interview with Sky News, Britain's Prince Charles (now King Charles III) linked the Syrian civil war to climate change. He said there was good evidence that "one of the major reasons for this horror in Syria was a drought that lasted for about five or six years". US President Barack Obama, Al Gore and the Democratic candidates Martin O'Malley and Bernie Sanders had made similar links that year.
The claim drew on a 2015 study in the journal PNAS by Colin Kelley and colleagues. They argued that a severe drought that began in 2006–07 and lasted into 2010, the worst in the instrumental record for the region, was made more likely by human-caused warming, wrecked farming in the northeast, and drove large numbers of rural families into cities just before the 2011 uprising.

Other researchers pushed back hard. In 2017 Jan Selby and co-authors argued that there was no clear evidence that climate change caused the pre-war drought, that the drought did not trigger truly mass migration, and that migrants were not a proven driver of the protests. They and others pointed instead to the Assad government's economic policies, including cuts to fuel and farm subsidies, along with authoritarian rule and the regional wave of Arab Spring protests. Political scientist Cullen Hendrix summed up the middle ground: the drought probably made things worse, but the evidence that it caused the war is not conclusive.
What wider research says about climate and conflict
Looking beyond Syria, studies have found real but modest links. A team led by Marshall Burke estimated in a 2009 PNAS paper that warming could add roughly 393,000 battle deaths in sub-Saharan Africa by 2030 if past patterns held. In 2013, Solomon Hsiang, Burke and Edward Miguel pooled dozens of studies and reported that hotter temperatures and extreme rainfall tend to coincide with more interpersonal and group violence.
Governments took notice. The US Department of Defense's 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap, presented by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, described climate change as a factor that could worsen instability, hunger and poverty around the world. In 2007, shortly after taking office, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warned that climate change posed as great a danger as war.
Critics urged caution from the start. A group led by ecologists at Colorado State University argued that crediting climate with such causal power oversimplifies systems shaped by many political and social forces. Halvard Buhaug of the Peace Research Institute Oslo found that, once other factors are considered, "Climate variability is a poor predictor of armed conflict". Today, most researchers describe climate as a "threat multiplier": its effects are strongest in aggregate, across many cases, and weakest when used to explain any single war.
The farming argument: fertilizer, fossil fuels and violence
Some activists go further and point to industrial agriculture itself. Agriculture is a major source of emissions: the IPCC's Special Report on Climate Change and Land, published on 8 August 2019, attributes about 23% of human greenhouse gas emissions to agriculture, forestry and other land use, and 21–37% to the global food system as a whole once processing, transport and waste are counted.
A key piece is synthetic nitrogen fertilizer. Since Fritz Haber and Carl Bosch developed the process in the early 20th century, ammonia made from air and natural gas has fed billions of people; nearly half of the nitrogen in human bodies today is estimated to come from it. Ammonia production uses around 1–2% of the world's energy and causes roughly 3% of global carbon dioxide emissions. The same chemistry also supplies explosives, which is how Germany kept fighting in World War I despite being cut off from imported nitrates.
Fertilizer has other costs. Runoff from farms feeds the low-oxygen "dead zone" in the Gulf of Mexico every summer, and nitrogen fertilizers release nitrous oxide, a greenhouse gas close to 300 times more powerful than carbon dioxide over a century. Journalist Tom Philpott, writing for Mother Jones, also noted the US fertilizer industry's growing reliance on cheap natural gas from fracking.

The Indian environmental campaigner Vandana Shiva, founder of the seed-saving movement Navdanya and author of Soil Not Oil, argues that this fossil-fuel model of farming is itself a driver of violence. In a 2015 essay written after the Paris attacks of 13 November, she linked terrorism and ecological destruction as two faces of the same war against the Earth. In her view, Green Revolution farming imposed through aid programmes degraded soil and water, destroyed rural livelihoods and left anger and conflict behind.
It is a powerful argument, but readers should weigh it carefully. Shiva's work has been criticised by scientists and journalists, including over her claims about genetically modified crops and farmer suicides, and her advice to ban synthetic fertilizers in Sri Lanka in 2021 coincided with a sharp fall in rice harvests before the ban was reversed. Her broad point that environmental damage and social conflict are connected is widely shared; her claim that farming chemistry is a root cause of war is a minority view.
Nigeria and Lake Chad: when land and water run short
Nigeria is often cited as a case where environmental pressure is dressed up as religious conflict. In the north, many herders are Muslim Fulani; in the Middle Belt and south, many farmers are Christian. As grazing land has shrunk and herders have moved south, clashes over land and water have grown deadly. Commentators have argued that what looks like religious violence has a strong ecological dimension, though population growth, weak policing, politics and banditry all play major roles.
Lake Chad tells a similar story. The lake, shared by Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria, shrank by roughly 90 percent between the 1960s and the 1990s, from about 25,000 square kilometres of open water to under 2,000 at its lowest. Drought, overgrazing and large irrigation schemes that diverted river water all contributed. More than 30 million people live in the wider basin, and the collapse of fishing and farming deepened poverty that armed groups such as Boko Haram later exploited. The lake has stabilised since the mid-1990s as rainfall partly recovered, but the region remains among the most fragile in the world.
So is religion to blame for war?

Religion is often blamed for war, and religious fanaticism has certainly fuelled terrible violence. Yet the record is mixed. Many of history's largest conflicts, including the French and Russian revolutions, the two world wars, and the wars in Korea and Vietnam, were driven mainly by politics, ideology, nationalism and power rather than faith. Writers such as Rabbi Alan Lurie have argued that religion is more often a banner than the root cause, with the desire for power and control doing most of the work.
The Syrian war shows how causes layer on each other. What began as protests against the government turned into an armed rebellion, then a sectarian struggle and a proxy war involving regional and global powers. By most UN estimates, around half of Syria's pre-war population was eventually forced from their homes.
What this means for understanding conflict
The most honest answer to "what causes wars?" is "several things at once". Climate shocks, failing harvests and shrinking water can strain societies, but whether that strain becomes violence depends on governments, inequality, history and the choices of leaders. Researchers at Columbia University's Earth Institute put it well: where poverty and tensions already exist, "climate can deliver the knockout punch".
That has practical meaning. Investing in water management, sustainable farming, fair land rights and responsive government is not only good environmental policy. It is also conflict prevention.
Sources: Cullen Hendrix, Political Violence at a Glance (2017); JSTOR Daily: Climate change and Syria's civil war; IPCC Special Report on Climate Change and Land; Wikipedia: Haber process; Wikipedia: Lake Chad; Wikipedia: Vandana Shiva. Original idea via Wakeupgvrnmnt and Idealist4ever. Chart data: Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research.

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