Xi Jinping's 2022 Xinjiang Visit and the Sinicization of Islam

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Originally published 2022-07-18.

Xi Jinping's July 2022 Remarks on Religion in Xinjiang

In mid-July 2022 Chinese leader Xi Jinping made a four-day tour of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China's far north-west. The message he left behind was blunt: religion in Xinjiang, and Islam above all, must follow the Communist Party's line. Official reports quoted him as saying that Islam in China "must be Chinese in orientation", and he told officials that believers should rally behind the party and the state.

The words matter because of where they were spoken. Xinjiang is home to the Uyghurs, a mostly Muslim, Turkic-speaking people, and since 2017 it has been the scene of a security campaign that rights groups, journalists and a United Nations office describe as mass arbitrary detention. Beijing denies any abuse and says its policies stopped terrorism. Below is what Xi said, what lay behind it, and what independent investigators found in the weeks that followed.

What Xi said during the July 2022 visit

The trip ran from Tuesday 12 to Friday 15 July 2022. State media showed Xi in the regional capital, Urumqi, visiting a residential community in the Tianshan district, and meeting leaders of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, a quasi-military body that runs its own farms, towns, courts and schools.

According to the Associated Press account of official statements, Xi demanded that the party's strategy be carried out completely and loyally, with social stability and long-term security as the overriding goals. He asked officials to strengthen the identification of every ethnic group with the Chinese nation and the party, and to adapt religion to what the party calls a socialist society. He also presented Xinjiang as a core hub for trade routes linking China with Central Asia and Europe.

Observers read the visit as a signal that nothing in Xinjiang policy was about to change, despite international criticism and sanctions.

What "Chinese in orientation" means in practice

The phrase belongs to a wider policy usually translated as the "sinicization" of religion. In the party's words, faiths active in China should absorb Chinese culture, accept party leadership and serve national goals. The ruling party is officially atheist and requires its members to be so, while the state constitution formally protects only what it calls normal religious activity, leaving the authorities to decide what counts as normal.

In Xinjiang, researchers and reporters have documented what that has meant on the ground: mosques with domes and minarets removed or altered, limits on religious dress and beards, restrictions on teaching religion to children, and Arabic-script signs taken down. The same policy has been applied, in different ways, to Christians, Tibetan Buddhists and Hui Muslims elsewhere in China.

So when Xi promised that the ordinary religious needs of believers would be met, he was not offering a relaxation. He was restating that the state, not the faithful, sets the limits.

The detention camps and the numbers behind them

From 2017 the authorities built a network of facilities that China officially calls "vocational education and training centres". Former detainees, leaked documents and satellite imagery describe them instead as internment camps where people were held without trial for praying, wearing a veil, travelling abroad or having relatives overseas.

No one outside the Chinese government knows exactly how many people passed through them. The most widely cited estimates fall between about one million and 1.8 million people at the camps' peak. The figure of roughly one million came from research by the US-based group Chinese Human Rights Defenders and was later echoed by UN experts; researcher Adrian Zenz has published higher estimates. In December 2019 China's ambassador to the UN in Geneva dismissed the one-million figure as false and said every trainee had completed the course and gone back to work. Investigators have since reported that many detainees were moved into the formal prison system rather than released.

In May 2022, just before a UN visit, the BBC and other outlets published the Xinjiang Police Files, a leak of internal police material including about 5,000 photographs and details of more than 2,800 detainees. China said the files were fabricated.

China's justification: terrorism and "separatism"

Beijing presents its Xinjiang policy as counter-terrorism. Between roughly 2009 and 2014 the region saw deadly riots and attacks, some blamed on Uyghur separatists, and the government points to a group it calls the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), now known as the Turkistan Islamic Party.

That threat was real but is contested in scale. In November 2020 the United States removed ETIM from its own list of terrorist organisations, saying it was no longer in existence. It remains on the UN Security Council's sanctions list. Rights groups argue that the danger posed by a small militant movement cannot justify detaining a large share of an entire ethnic group, and that most people held had no link to violence at all.

The United States and the European Union have accused China of grave rights abuses. Washington and others imposed visa bans and sanctions on officials, and the US has blocked imports of cotton and other goods over evidence of forced labour. China rejects every accusation as interference in its internal affairs.

Michelle Bachelet's visit and the UN assessment

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights at the time, Michelle Bachelet, visited China, including Xinjiang, in May 2022 after years of negotiation. The trip was heavily criticised. Amnesty International noted that she acknowledged she could not speak to any detained Uyghurs or their families and was accompanied by state officials throughout.

Her office's full report came out on 31 August 2022, in the final minutes of her term. It found that the extent of "arbitrary and discriminatory detention of members of Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim groups" may amount to crimes against humanity. It called on China to release everyone arbitrarily held and to clarify the fate of missing people. China rejected the assessment and published a lengthy rebuttal alongside it.

How to read official statements on Xinjiang

A speech by a head of state tells you what a government intends and how it wants to be seen. It does not tell you how a policy feels to the people living under it. For that, you need evidence the government does not control: testimony from former detainees and their families, leaked documents, satellite images of construction, and the work of independent researchers.

A few practical tips help when following news from the region:

  • Check the date. Facts about camps, releases and prisons in Xinjiang have shifted over time, so a 2019 figure may not describe 2022.
  • Look for who is speaking. State media, exile organisations and Western governments all have a perspective; claims backed by documents or multiple witnesses carry more weight.
  • Separate words from findings. Xi's remarks are a statement of policy; the UN assessment is an investigation's conclusion. Both are news, but they are different kinds of evidence.

Two months after the July visit, the UN's verdict added an official international voice to what Uyghur families had been saying for years. Xi's speech, meanwhile, made clear that Beijing intended to continue on the same path.

Sources: Associated Press via Religion News Service, 18 July 2022; NDTV (original report); Wikipedia: Xinjiang internment camps; OHCHR assessment of human rights concerns in Xinjiang, 31 August 2022; Amnesty International USA, 1 September 2022.

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