Originally published 2022-05-10.

In May 2022, CIA director William Burns said China's leadership had been unsettled by Russia's poor military performance in Ukraine and by the damage that its association with Moscow could do to China's reputation. He was equally clear, though, that the war had not weakened Xi Jinping's determination to bring Taiwan under Beijing's control. In his view it was changing China's thinking about how and when it might try, not whether it wanted to.
This piece explains what Burns said, the context behind it, how China actually responded to the invasion, and how his assessment held up in the months and years that followed.
What Burns said
Burns spoke at a Financial Times event in Washington on Saturday 7 May 2022, about ten weeks into Russia's full-scale invasion. A career diplomat who had served as US ambassador to Moscow before taking over the CIA in 2021, he is one of the most experienced Russia watchers in the US government, which is why his remarks drew wide attention.
His central point was that Beijing was studying the war closely. In his words: "Clearly the Chinese leadership is trying to look carefully at what lessons they should draw from Ukraine about their own ambitions in Taiwan."
He then described several things that, in the CIA's judgement, were troubling Xi:
- Reputation. Burns said Xi was "a little bit unsettled by the reputational damage" China could suffer from being linked to the brutality of Russia's attack on Ukrainians.
- Western unity. Putin's war had pushed Europe and the United States closer together, the opposite of what Beijing and Moscow had hoped for, and Chinese leaders had been struck by how quickly the transatlantic allies agreed on heavy economic sanctions.
- The economy. The war added uncertainty at a sensitive time, with China's own economy strained by zero-COVID lockdowns and the Communist Party's 20th congress due that autumn.
- Russia's performance. Chinese leaders were likely surprised both by the failures of Russia's army and by the "whole-of-society" resistance of Ukrainians.
Burns also stressed what had not changed. He said he did not believe the war had eroded Xi's long-term determination over Taiwan, but that it was affecting Beijing's calculations about timing and method. He added that Xi had ordered his military to build the capability to seize the island, and was careful to say that this was not the same as a decision to invade.
China's position on the war
Just three weeks before the invasion, on 4 February 2022, the day the Beijing Winter Olympics opened, Xi and Vladimir Putin met in Beijing and issued a long joint statement declaring that the friendship between their countries had "no limits". That phrase came to haunt Beijing once the tanks rolled.
Chinese officials insisted they had not known of Putin's plans and said the conflict was not in China's interest. US officials, according to Newsweek's reporting, believed Beijing was aware an operation was coming but underestimated how large it would be. China did not condemn the invasion. Instead it called for peace talks and an end to fighting on both sides, criticised Western sanctions, and avoided supplying weapons openly.
At the same time, reports pointed to a strongly pro-Russian tone in Chinese state media and on tightly controlled social platforms, where criticism of Russia was often removed. European governments accused Beijing of giving Moscow political cover, a theme that would shape EU–China relations for years.
Why Taiwan is the real question
Taiwan has been governed separately from mainland China since 1949, when the Republic of China government lost the civil war to the Communists and retreated to the island. In 2022 that was 73 years of separate rule. Taiwan has its own elected government, currency, armed forces and a large, high-tech economy that makes most of the world's most advanced computer chips.
The People's Republic of China regards Taiwan as part of its territory and says it prefers peaceful "reunification", but it has never ruled out force; a 2005 law explicitly allows "non-peaceful means". Only about a dozen countries formally recognise the Republic of China today, after the United Nations seat passed to Beijing in 1971. The United States does not recognise Taiwan as a state, but under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act it sells the island weapons and insists that any change to its status must be peaceful.
That is why the war in Ukraine was watched so closely in Taipei and Beijing alike. Analysts asked whether a large power could quickly overrun a smaller neighbour, how the West would respond, and how well sanctions would work. Russia's struggles suggested that an invasion, especially one across about 130 kilometres of sea, could be far harder than planners expect.
The 2027 date
Burns was not the only US official speaking about Chinese military ambitions that spring. A few days earlier, on 3 May 2022, General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told senators that Xi wanted the People's Liberation Army to have the capability to take Taiwan by 2027, the centenary of the PLA's founding, and called that "a very tall order". Pentagon spokesman John Kirby repeated that Washington did not want the status quo changed by force.
Burns returned to the theme at Georgetown University in February 2023. He said US intelligence knew Xi had told the military to be ready to invade by 2027, but again stressed that this did not mean a decision had been taken for 2027 or any other year. He described Xi as "surprised and unsettled" by Russia's very poor performance, and he warned: "I wouldn't underestimate President Xi's ambitions with regard to Taiwan."
How to read an intelligence chief's assessment
It is worth keeping in mind what remarks like these are and are not. Burns was offering the CIA's judgement about the thinking of a leadership that is famously closed. Intelligence agencies rarely reveal their sources, and public comments by their directors are partly meant to send signals: to allies, to the public and to Beijing itself. They are informed assessments, not a window into Xi's private thoughts, and they cannot predict a future decision.
Seen in that light, Burns's message was consistent and cautious. He did not claim that the war had deterred China, nor that an attack was imminent. His argument was narrower: the Ukraine war raised the perceived costs and risks of using force, and Beijing was adjusting its calculations rather than abandoning its goals.
Key takeaways
- In May 2022 the CIA judged that Beijing was uneasy about Russia's failures and the reputational cost of the "no limits" partnership.
- The agency did not think the war had weakened Xi's aim of controlling Taiwan; it believed it was influencing timing and method.
- US officials have described 2027 as a target date for military capability, not a fixed date for an attack.
- China's public line has been neutrality and calls for peace, while it avoided condemning Moscow.
Sources: Newsweek, 10 May 2022: China unsettled by Russia's Ukraine failures, CIA director says; Reuters via The Financial Express, February 2023: CIA chief warns against underestimating Xi's ambitions toward Taiwan; Wikipedia: Political status of Taiwan.

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