First published December 23, 2021.
In December 2021, four months after seizing power, senior Taliban officials appealed to the world for financial help as Afghanistan's economy went into free fall. Their central demand was the release of the country's central-bank reserves, frozen abroad after the takeover. They warned that without help, hunger and a new wave of refugees would follow. The appeal highlighted a hard dilemma for foreign governments: how to keep millions of Afghans from starving without handing money to an unrecognised regime.
What the Taliban asked for
The most direct appeal came from Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, then the Taliban government's acting deputy foreign minister, speaking at a gathering held to mark International Migrants Day in mid-December 2021. He argued that Washington bore responsibility for the crisis because the reserves of Afghanistan's central bank, Da Afghanistan Bank, had been blocked.
According to Reuters, Stanikzai said the frozen funds were hurting "the common people and not Taliban authorities", and warned that if the political and economic situation did not change, there would be more migration. In other words, he presented the refugee risk as a reason for Western countries, especially in Europe, to act.
Some early reports described Stanikzai as foreign minister; the foreign minister at the time was Amir Khan Muttaqi, and Stanikzai was his deputy.
The frozen reserves explained
Before August 2021 Afghanistan's central bank, like most central banks, kept much of its reserves overseas. When the Taliban took Kabul, the United States froze roughly $9.5 billion in Afghan government assets. The largest portion, about $7 billion, was held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; smaller amounts were in Europe and elsewhere.
Washington's position was that the money could not go to a group still under US and UN sanctions, whose government no country had recognised. The Taliban's position was that the reserves belonged to the Afghan state and its people. There was a further complication: families of victims of the 11 September 2001 attacks had won court judgments against the Taliban and sought to collect from those same funds.
In February 2022 the Biden administration announced it would divide the $7 billion: half to be held for possible use for the benefit of the Afghan people, without Taliban access, and half left for the courts to decide on in the 9/11 cases. In February 2023 a US federal judge ruled that the victims' families could not seize the central-bank money, finding that the court was constitutionally restrained from allowing it.
Why the economy collapsed so fast
Frozen reserves were only one part of the problem. For two decades the Afghan state had depended heavily on foreign money: international grants paid for most public spending, including health care and teachers' salaries. When the Taliban returned, donors halted most of that funding, and the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund suspended payments.
The results were immediate. Banks ran short of cash and limited withdrawals, public employees went unpaid, prices rose and the currency weakened. Afghanistan's real GDP shrank by an estimated 14.5% in 2021 and a further 6% in 2022, and around a fifth of the economy is estimated to have vanished after the takeover. Drought made the situation worse, and the World Food Programme reported that close to 20 million people faced crisis or emergency levels of food insecurity.
Humanitarian aid versus central-bank money
It helps to separate two kinds of support that were often blurred together. Humanitarian aid means food, medicine, shelter and cash delivered mostly by UN agencies and charities directly to people in need. Central-bank reserves are the state's own financial assets, used to stabilise the currency and pay for imports.
Western governments chose to expand humanitarian aid while keeping the reserves locked. UN funding helped feed millions and later contributed to some stabilisation of the currency. But aid agencies repeatedly warned that emergency deliveries could not replace a functioning economy, a banking system that worked or salaries for doctors and teachers.
Why donors were reluctant
The Taliban had told the world they would govern more moderately than in the 1990s. Within months, however, there were widespread reports of revenge killings and detentions of former officials and critics, and women were pushed out of most public jobs. Girls' secondary schools stayed closed in much of the country, and in later years women were barred from universities and from working for many aid organisations.
These policies made donor governments far less willing to release funds or recognise the government. They also directly worsened the humanitarian situation: barring Afghan women from aid work, for example, made it harder to reach female-headed households.
Background: how the Taliban returned
US and NATO forces invaded Afghanistan in late 2001, after the 9/11 attacks, and quickly removed the first Taliban government. The Taliban then fought a long insurgency. After the 2020 Doha agreement set a timetable for withdrawal, the Afghan army and government collapsed during a rapid Taliban offensive, and the group entered Kabul on 15 August 2021. The last American troops left on 30 August.
Millions of Afghans have been displaced inside the country or have fled abroad over the decades of war, mostly to Iran and Pakistan, and the 2021 takeover added hundreds of thousands more.
What happened afterwards
The worst predictions of total famine did not come true, partly because of large-scale aid, but Afghanistan remains one of the world's poorest countries, with almost half the population below the national poverty line in 2024. The central-bank reserves are still out of the Taliban's reach.
Stanikzai himself later broke publicly with the leadership. In January 2025 he called for girls' education to be restored; he left Afghanistan soon afterwards and was replaced as deputy foreign minister.
Sources: original reporting by Reuters (18 December 2021); Wikipedia: Da Afghanistan Bank; Wikipedia: Economy of Afghanistan; Wikipedia: Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai; Wikipedia: Fall of Kabul (2021).

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