Originally published 2021-07-03.
In June 2021 Germany refused to halt or delay six Type 214 submarines being built for Turkey, and Greece reacted with open frustration. Athens had asked Berlin to suspend the programme, arguing that the new boats would tip the naval balance in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean at a time of high tension. Germany’s defence minister replied that existing contracts made that impossible. The row exposed a deeper argument inside the European Union about how to deal with Turkey, a NATO ally and EU candidate whose relations with Greece and Cyprus had reached a low point.
The submarines at the centre of the dispute
The boats are the Reis class, a Turkish version of the German Type 214 design. A consortium led by Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW), part of thyssenkrupp Marine Systems, signed the contract with Turkey on 2 July 2009, worth about €2.06 billion. The six submarines are assembled at Turkey’s Gölcük Naval Shipyard with German design and components and some Turkish subsystems.
Their key feature is air-independent propulsion based on fuel cells, which lets a conventional submarine stay submerged for much longer than older diesel-electric boats, making it far harder to detect. They are named after Ottoman admirals: Piri Reis, Hızır Reis, Murat Reis, Aydın Reis, Seydi Ali Reis and Selman Reis. The first, TCG Piri Reis, was commissioned in August 2024 and the second, Hızır Reis, in late 2025, with the remaining four following in stages.
Greece itself operates German-designed Type 214 submarines of the Papanikolis class, which is part of why Athens follows Turkey’s programme so closely. The new Turkish boats are widely seen as narrowing an advantage the Greek navy had long held under water.
Greece asks Berlin to stop the deal
In mid-June 2021 Greece’s defence minister, Nikos Panagiotopoulos, phoned his German counterpart, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, and asked that the agreement be suspended. According to the Greek account of the call, she refused, saying the programme cannot be stopped – or even delayed – because the construction company Thyssen is bound by contracts signed since 2002.
The 2002 date likely reflects the programme’s earlier stages; the main construction contract itself dates from 2009.
Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias pressed the point with Germany’s Social Democrats. Meeting SPD foreign policy spokesman Nils Schmid in Athens, he expressed his profound disappointment
over the party’s stance on motions for an arms embargo against Turkey, and said that he and Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis had raised the Aegean balance with almost every senior German politician.
Germany’s foreign minister at the time, Heiko Maas, argued that rejecting an arms embargo was the strategically correct choice and said he hoped the Eastern Mediterranean disputes could be settled through diplomacy.
Why Greece and Cyprus see a threat
The submarine row did not come out of nowhere. In 2020 Turkish survey and drilling ships, escorted by warships, operated in waters that Greece and Cyprus claim as their continental shelf or exclusive economic zone, and Greek and Turkish frigates collided during a tense stand-off that summer. Turkey disputes the maritime boundaries, arguing that Greek islands should not generate full zones close to the Turkish coast.
Cyprus has its own long history with Turkey. Turkish forces invaded in 1974 and have occupied the northern third of the island ever since; only Turkey recognises the breakaway administration in the north. Talks on reunifying the island, held in Geneva in April 2021, ended in deadlock.
Turkey’s wider military role also worried its neighbours. It launched several operations into northern Syria, backed Azerbaijan in the 2020 war over Nagorno-Karabakh (known to Armenians as Artsakh), and supported armed factions in Libya and Syria, some of which have been accused of serious abuses. Critics in Athens and Nicosia argued that selling advanced weapons to such a government sent the wrong signal.
Human rights concerns inside Turkey
Alongside the security arguments, there were concerns about the state of democracy in Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, especially after the failed coup attempt of 2016. Human Rights Watch reported that around 87 journalists and media workers were in prison or pretrial detention on terrorism charges linked to their work. Former opposition leader Selahattin Demirtaş had been detained since 2016, and civil society figure Osman Kavala since 2017, with Turkey refusing to comply with European Court of Human Rights rulings ordering their release. Dozens of elected pro-Kurdish mayors had been removed from office and replaced by government appointees.
In May 2021 the European Parliament adopted a report drafted by its Turkey rapporteur, the Spanish socialist Nacho Sánchez Amor, which said relations had reached a historic low and called for an immediate change of course on the rule of law and human rights. He described it as probably the toughest ever in its criticism
. The Parliament also proposed suspending Turkey’s EU accession talks, which had already been frozen in practice since around 2016.
The EU summit and the sanctions debate
Greece and Cyprus had pushed for EU sanctions on Turkey since 2020. In December of that year EU leaders agreed to prepare a list of possible targets linked to the unauthorised drilling, but larger steps were put on hold as tensions eased in early 2021 and exploratory talks between Athens and Ankara resumed.
At the European Council summit of 24–25 June 2021, EU leaders again chose engagement over punishment. Their conclusions repeated the EU’s readiness to work with Turkey in a phased, proportionate and reversible way in areas of common interest, conditional on de-escalation, while keeping the option of further measures open. For many Greeks this confirmed a familiar complaint: that the EU’s largest economies, Germany above all, put trade, migration cooperation and NATO unity ahead of solidarity with frontline members.
Germany’s position had its own logic. Turkey is a NATO ally, hosts millions of refugees under a 2016 deal with the EU, and is a major trading partner. Berlin argued that dialogue offered more leverage than embargoes, and that cancelling signed contracts would carry legal and financial costs.
Why the deal still matters
An arms programme passes through several stages: a contract, export licences for components, construction and finally delivery. Opponents in 2021 were asking Germany to use the licensing stage to pause the boats, something Berlin was unwilling to do. By the mid-2020s the submarines were entering service, and the debate had moved on to other arms deals, such as Turkey’s interest in Eurofighter Typhoon jets.
For readers trying to understand Greek-Turkish relations, the submarine dispute is a useful case study. It shows how a contract signed in calmer times can become a political problem a decade later, and how differently EU members weigh security, business and values when a neighbour like Turkey is involved.
Sources: Greek Reporter (17 June 2021): German submarine sale to Turkey rankles Greece; Wikipedia: Reis-class submarine; Human Rights Watch, World Report 2021: Turkey.
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