Saudi Arabia's 2020 Unofficial Boycott of Turkish Goods Explained

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Originally published 2020-09-29.

In late September and October 2020, Turkish exporters began reporting that their goods were being held up or turned away in Saudi Arabia. Lorries waited at borders, shipments sat in ports, and Saudi buyers told Turkish suppliers they could no longer take their products. Many headlines described this as a Saudi "embargo" or "ban". That was not quite accurate: Riyadh never announced a formal legal ban. What Turkish businesses faced was an unofficial boycott, encouraged by prominent Saudi voices and reflected in slower customs clearance and nervous importers, while the Saudi government said it remained committed to its trade agreements.

Reports of Saudi Restrictions on Turkish Goods in 2020

The difference matters. A formal embargo is a published legal measure with clear rules. An informal boycott works through pressure, delay and fear of falling out of favour, which can be just as damaging for traders but is much harder to pin down or challenge. Below is what was reported at the time, the long rivalry behind it, and how relations between the two countries changed afterwards.

What Turkish exporters reported

The complaints came from Turkish trade groups and companies, and were picked up by Turkish newspapers. Exporters of fresh fruit and vegetables, textiles, furniture and other consumer goods said orders had dried up and cargo was stuck. Perishable food was the most exposed, because every day of delay meant spoiled stock.

A Turkish businessman who spoke anonymously to the newspaper Cumhuriyet, as reported by Ahval, said Saudi customers were happy with Turkish products but could no longer buy them. Instead, he said, they were asking for goods to be routed through other countries: "They say send them to us via a third country." He added that small and medium firms were especially worried, as exports from south-eastern provinces such as Hatay, Gaziantep and Diyarbakır were grinding to a halt.

Some Turkish reports also claimed that Saudi authorities would fine anyone caught breaking the boycott and were discouraging Saudi citizens from travelling to Turkey for holidays. Those claims came from Turkish media and business sources and were not confirmed by any published Saudi regulation. International shipping companies, however, did warn customers about difficulties moving Turkish-origin goods into the kingdom, and even products labelled "Made in Turkey" by foreign brands were reportedly affected.

The Muslim Brotherhood rivalry

The trade dispute grew out of a political rivalry that had been building for years. At its centre is the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist movement founded in Egypt in 1928. The Brotherhood briefly held power in Egypt after Mohamed Morsi won the 2012 presidential election, before he was removed by the army in 2013.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates see the Brotherhood as a threat to their own systems of government and treat it as a terrorist organisation. Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), by contrast, have long been sympathetic to the movement and gave refuge to many of its members after 2013. That basic split shaped how the two countries lined up across the region.

Qatar, Khashoggi and a deepening split

In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt cut diplomatic and transport ties with Qatar, accusing it of backing extremist groups, including the Brotherhood. Turkey sided firmly with Qatar. It had already been building military and economic links with Doha, and it sent extra troops to its base there and flew in food supplies. Riyadh saw this as Turkey taking the other side in a Gulf quarrel.

The relationship then hit its lowest point in October 2018, when the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi was killed by a team of Saudi agents inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Turkish officials released a steady stream of details about the killing, and Erdoğan said the order had come from the highest levels of the Saudi government. The case badly damaged trust between the two leaderships.

In early 2020 the war of words continued, with each side blocking the other's news websites. By the autumn, calls to boycott Turkish goods were circulating widely in Saudi Arabia, at the same moment as fighting broke out between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, a conflict in which Turkey strongly backed Azerbaijan.

Turkey's wider regional ambitions in 2019 and 2020

The boycott also reflected unease about Turkey's growing reach across the Middle East and North Africa. In October 2019, Turkish forces launched an offensive into northern Syria against Kurdish-led forces. In Libya, Turkey sent military support to the Tripoli-based government, and France accused it of breaking the UN arms embargo on Libya. In the autumn of 2020, reports emerged that Turkey was sending Syrian fighters to Azerbaijan to support its war against Armenia.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE were on the opposite side of several of these conflicts. Neither country, it should be said, came to the dispute with a clean record: human rights groups criticise both governments heavily, and Freedom House rated both Turkey and Saudi Arabia "Not Free" in 2020.

Boycott or embargo? Why the wording matters

Much of the confusion around this story came from the words used. A few points help when reading similar trade-dispute headlines:

  • Look for an official measure. A real embargo is usually announced in a government decree, a customs notice or a trade ministry statement. None was published in this case.
  • Check who is speaking. Here, most of the evidence came from Turkish exporters and media, who had good reasons to complain loudly but also a stake in the story.
  • Watch for denials. Saudi officials said the kingdom was keeping its trade commitments, while the restrictions on the ground continued informally.
  • Follow the date. Informal boycotts can fade quietly. A report from autumn 2020 does not describe trade today.

How relations changed afterwards

The boycott hurt Turkey at a time when its currency and economy were already under strain, and Turkish business groups pressed Ankara to mend fences. After the US election in November 2020, both sides began cautious moves towards reconciliation. The Gulf states ended their blockade of Qatar in January 2021, and Turkey repaired relations with the UAE later that year.

In 2022 a Turkish court transferred the Khashoggi trial to Saudi Arabia, removing a major obstacle. Erdoğan travelled to Saudi Arabia and met Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and the two sides pledged to expand economic ties. After the devastating earthquakes in Turkey in February 2023, Saudi Arabia offered aid and financial support. The 2020 boycott is therefore best read as one chapter in a rivalry that later gave way to pragmatic cooperation.

Sources: Wikipedia: Saudi Arabia–Turkey relations; Freedom House.

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