Originally published 2020-04-16.

In March 2013 Ecuador announced plans to auction oil exploration rights over more than three million hectares of its southern Amazon, roughly a third of the country’s rainforest. Chinese state oil companies, including China Petrochemical (Sinopec) and China National Offshore Oil, were among the most eager bidders. Seven Indigenous nations living on the land said no one had asked for their consent. The story, first reported by the Guardian, shows how debt, oil and land rights collided in one of the most biodiverse places on Earth, and how the dispute still runs today.
What Ecuador was actually selling
Headlines at the time spoke of Ecuador “selling the Amazon” to China. That is not quite what an oil auction does. Ecuador’s constitution keeps subsoil resources in state hands; what companies bid for are contracts to explore and produce oil inside defined areas called blocks. The forest, and the people who live in it, stay where they are, but roads, seismic surveys, drilling pads and pipelines can follow.
The process became known as the Eleventh Oil Round, or Southeast Round. According to Amazon Frontlines, the government drew up 21 new blocks in 2011 without consulting the communities inside them, and in 2012 formally offered 13 of them for tender. Investor roadshows were held in Quito, Houston, Paris and Beijing, where Chinese firms showed strong interest.
The area lies between the Pastaza river and the Peruvian border, in territory belonging largely to the Kichwa, Sápara, Shuar, Achuar, Shiwiar, Andoa and Waorani peoples. Much of it had seen little or no oil activity before.
Why China, and why then
The economics explain a lot. From 2009 onward China had become Ecuador’s main lender, offering billions of dollars in loans repaid largely through future oil shipments. By early 2013 Ecuador owed China more than $7 billion, a sum equal to over a tenth of its GDP. Chinese money also financed big hydroelectric projects, and China National Petroleum Corporation was reported to be seeking a 30 percent stake in a planned $10 billion refinery on the Pacific coast.
Ecuador had defaulted on part of its foreign debt in 2008, which made Western bond markets expensive or closed to it. Chinese loans filled the gap, and oil was the collateral. Adam Zuckerman of the U.S.-based group Amazon Watch told the Guardian that he saw the auction as “more of a debt issue,” arguing that dependence on Chinese finance made the government readier to bend on social and environmental rules.
The government saw it differently. Oil revenue paid for roads, schools and social programmes under President Rafael Correa, and officials argued that developing the south was a matter of national interest. Andrés Donoso Fabara, Ecuador’s secretary of hydrocarbons, accused opponents of having a political agenda and said the state was legally entitled to proceed even without the agreement of the communities.
The Indigenous objection and the Sarayaku ruling
Indigenous groups did not simply object to oil; they objected to being skipped. Between 2012 and 2013, at least 28 Indigenous organisations and women’s associations issued formal resolutions rejecting the round. Narcisa Mashienta, a Shuar leader, told the Guardian: “They have not consulted us, and we’re here to tell the big investors that they don’t have our permission to exploit our land.”
Their position had fresh legal weight. In 2012 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled in favour of the Kichwa people of Sarayaku, whose territory had been entered by an Argentine company, CGC, for seismic exploration in the early 2000s without consultation, backed by soldiers. The court found that Ecuador had violated the community’s rights to consultation, communal property and cultural identity, and set out that states must consult Indigenous peoples in good faith, in advance and in an informed way before projects that affect their land.
There is an important legal nuance here. The court’s standard requires genuine prior consultation, and for large projects with major impacts it points towards obtaining consent. Governments, including Ecuador’s, have often read that as a duty to consult rather than an obligation to accept a veto. That gap between “consultation” and “consent” is at the heart of most Amazon oil disputes in the region.
Across the border: Peru’s emergency
The same week, Peru declared an environmental state of emergency in the Pastaza river basin of its northern Amazon, close to the Ecuadorian border. As journalist Dan Collyns reported for the Guardian, Indigenous communities there had complained for decades about pollution, and government tests had found high levels of petroleum-related compounds. The Argentine company Pluspetrol had operated oil fields in the area since 2001, after decades of earlier production by other operators.
The Peruvian case is a separate project in a separate country, but it is relevant. It was a living example, just across the border, of what long-term oil extraction can leave behind in rivers that communities use for drinking water and fishing. For Ecuadorians, the bigger memory was closer to home: decades of contamination in the northern Amazon around Lago Agrio, left from Texaco’s operations, which became one of the world’s longest-running environmental lawsuits.
What happened after 2013
The auction did not deliver the windfall the government hoped for. Interest was weaker than expected, and only a few blocks were eventually assigned:
- Blocks 74 and 75 went to Ecuador’s state oil company in 2015.
- Blocks 79 and 83, covering about 3,000 square kilometres in Kichwa and Sápara territory, went in 2016 to Andes Petroleum, a company owned by Chinese state oil groups.
Indigenous communities kept organising. In 2019 Shiwiar, Sápara and Kichwa groups publicly rejected plans to tender further blocks, and legal challenges over consultation have continued in Ecuador’s courts. In 2023 Ecuadorians voted in a national referendum to keep oil in the ground in the Yasuní National Park’s ITT block, a separate area further north, although campaigners say the result has been slow to be carried out. In 2025 the government again promoted southeastern blocks to investors as part of a new hydrocarbon plan.
Why it still matters
The 2013 auction is a useful case study for anyone trying to understand the Amazon rainforest today. It shows that deforestation is not only about chainsaws and cattle; it is also about national budgets, foreign loans and who gets a say over land. Several lessons stand out:
- Debt shapes environmental policy. Countries that owe heavily and are paid in commodities face pressure to extract more.
- Consultation is contested. International law requires it, but its strength in practice depends on courts and political will.
- Indigenous land is often the best-protected forest. Studies across the Amazon have found lower deforestation inside Indigenous territories, which is why their rights and conservation are increasingly seen as linked.
Some communities have won notable cases against oil projects in the years since, but the basic tension between oil revenue and forest peoples has not gone away.
Sources: The Guardian, 26 March 2013: Ecuador and Chinese oil bids (original reporting); The Guardian, 26 March 2013: Peru declares environmental emergency; Jonathan Turley, March 2013 summary; Amazon Frontlines fact sheet on the Southeast Round, 2025 (PDF, Spanish); Wikipedia: Sarayaku.

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